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Summary findings
What  is the most  cost-effective  way to organize  Fees  and costs are kept  low by reducinig incentives  for
individual  accounts  that  are part  of a mandatory  social  marketing,  avoiding  excess capacity  at system  start-up,
security  system?  Defined-contribution  individual-account  and constraining  choice  to investment  portfolios  that  are
components  of social  security  systems  are  criticized  for  inexpensive  to manage.
being  too  expensive.  James,  Smalhout,  and Vittas  In developed  financial  markets,  the biggest  potential
investigate  the cost-effectiveness  of two  methods  for  cost  saving  stems  from  constrained  portfolio  choice,
constructing  mandatory  individual  accounts:  especially  from  a concentration  on passive  investment.
*  Investing  through  the  retail  market  with  relatively  The  biggest cost  saving  for  a given portfolio  and for
open  choice  among  investment  companies  (the method  countries  with  weak  financial  markets  comes  from
first used  by Chile  and adopted  by most  Latin American  reduced  marketing  activities.
countries).  In the retail market, where annualized fees and costs
*  Investing through the institutional market with  range from 0.8 percent to 1.5 percent of assets, use of
constrained choice.  the institutional market in individual retirement account
For the retail market, they use data from mandatory  systems has reduced those fees and costs to less than 0.2
pension funds in Chile and other Latin American  percent to 0.6 percent of assets. This reduction can
countries and from voluntary mutual funds in the United  increase pensions by 10-20 percent relative to the retail
States. For the institutional market, they use data from  market. Countries that can surmount rebidding
systems in Bolivia and Sweden and from larger pension  problems, weaker performance incentives, inflexibility in
plans and the federal Thrift Saving Plan in the United  the face of unforeseen contingencies, and an increased
States.  probability of corruption,, collusion, and regulatory
The institutional approaches aggregate numerous small  capture should seriously consider the institutional
accounts into large blocks of money and negotiate fees  approach, especially at the start-up of a new multipillar
on a centralized basis, often through competitive  system or for systems with small asset bases.
bidding. They retain workers'  choice on some funds.
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Administrative Costs and the Organization
of Individual Retirement Account Systems:
A Comparative Perspective
Estelie James,  James  Smalhout,  and Dimitri  VittasIntroduction 1
Prefunding is now seen as a desirable characteristic of old age security systems because it
can be used to  increase national saving, makes the financial sustainability of the system  less
sensitive to  demographic shocks, and reduces the need to  increase taxes as populations age.
With prefunding comes the need to determine how the funds will be managed.  Those who fear
political manipulation of publicly managed funds see defined contribution individual accounts
(IA's)  as a way to decentralize control and thereby achieve a better allocation of the funds.  But
IA's  have  been  criticized  on  other  grounds,  most  important  among  them  being  high
administrative costs. Many countries now in the process of establishing their IA systems are
concerned about these costs and are seeking ways to keep them low.
TIhis  paper investigates the cost-effectiveness of two alternative methods for organizing
mandatory  IA's:  1) investing through the  retail market,  in which workers  choose  their  own
pension fund, entry is open subject to regulations and prices are set by the fund; and 2) investing
through the institutional  market with entry and price negotiated for  a larger group  or for the
entire covered labor  force and worker  choice constrained by  group choice.  In a  competitive
bidding process, which is a recommended way of determining group choice, primary competition
takes place at the point of entry to the market, and a more limited secondary competition for
individual workers occurs among the winners of the primary competition. In both the retail and
institutional cases government "organizes" the markets, but in the former regulations are used
while in the latter competitive bidding or other group mechanisms are used. Also in both cases
1 We wish to thank Gary Ferrier  of the University  of Arkansas  who collaborated  on an earlier related paper, and
Deepthi  Fernando  and Marianne  Leenaerts  of the World  Bank for their excellent  research  assistance.  We also thank
Peter Agardh of MPIR, Stefan Ackerby of the Swedish  Industry Ministry,  Hans Jacobson of the PPM and Pia
Nilsson  of the Swedish  Association  of Mutual  Funds  for the useful information  they provided,  and Augusto  Iglesias
for his very  helpful comments  and criticisms  of an earlier  draft.
3most countries will end up with a relatively concentrated market due to scale economies, but the
paths differ, as well as the equilibrium costs and fees, due to the differing paths. Our question:
what is the most cost-effective way to organize a mandatory IA system?
We  start  with  a  simple  stylized  illustration  of  retail  and  institutional  markets  that
decomposes total costs into its investment, record-keeping, marketing and start-up components
(Part I). To analyze actual costs in the retail market we use data from mandatory  schemes in
Chile and other Latin American countries (Part II), complemented by mutual fund data from the
U.S., an example of a relatively well run voluntary retail financial industry that has much in
common with decentralized IA systems (Part III). To analyze costs in the institutional market we
use data from large centralized pension funds in the U.S. (Part IV) as well as from  mandatory
and voluntary IA systems in various  countries-Bolivia,  Sweden and the  Thrift Saving  Plan
(TSP) in the U.S.--that operate in the institutional market (Part V). They do so by aggregating
small  contributions  into  large blocks  of  money,  constraining  choice  regarding  investment
portfolios and managers, and negotiating fees on a group or centralized basis. In Bolivia and the
TSP entry has been  limited and fees  set  in a  competitive bidding  process;  in  Sweden price
ceilings attempt to mimic the marginal cost function and the sliding fee scale in the institutional
market.
Empirical evidence in this paper and elsewhere find substantial economies of scale and
scope in asset management. Both the retail and institutional markets exploit these economies, but
in different ways. The retail market pools funds from many individual investors, enabling them
to beneftt from scale economies, but at the cost of high marketing expenses-about  half of total
costs--that are needed to attract and aggregate small investments into large pools. In the Chilean
AFP and U.S. mutual fund industries, most annual fees range between .8 and 1.5% of assets and
4marketing is the largest cost component. Slightly larger numbers obtain in retail personal pension
plans in the U.K. and  master trusts in Australia (Murthi, Orszag and Orszag 1999, Blake 2000,
Bateman 1999, Bateman and Piggott 1999). A 1% annual fee reduces retirement accumulations
by 20% for a lifetime contributor, so administrative costs in the retail market reduce pensions by
15-30%.
The institutional market, which caters to large investors, benefits from scale economies
without large marketing costs, hence its total costs are much lower. We investigate whether and
how mandatory IA systems that consist of many small investors could be set up to capture these
same advantages. We find that use of the institutional market in IA systems in Bolivia, Sweden
and the U.S. has reduced fees to less than .6% and in  some cases to less than  .2% of assets.
These lower fees stemming from lower administrative costs in the institutional market reduce
pensions only 10% or less, a potential saving of 10-20% relative to the retail market.
Costs  must  always  be  weighed  against  benefits.  Potential  pitfalls  inherent  in  the
institutional  approach  include  the  increased  probability  of  corruption,  collusion,  regulatory
capture, decreased performance incentives, rebidding problems and inflexibility in the face of
unforeseen  contingencies  (Parts  V  and  VI).  If  these  problems  can  be  surmounted,  the
institutional approach is worth serious consideration, especially for countries with  small asset
bases and at the start-up phase of a new IA system.
I. How Administrative Costs Vary Across Time and Systems and How to Compare Them
We start by setting forth a small model of the components of administrative costs that
can be used to understand differences in costs across time and systems.
TOTADMINCOSTXt=  STARTUPCOST + R&C + INV + MARKETING, where:
TOTADMINCOST't = total administrative cost for pension fund or system i in year t
5STARTUPCOST = capital costs incurred in the early years of a new system or fund
R&C = record-keeping and communication costs;
INV = investment cost;
MARKETING = marketing cost.
Each of these cost components is determined quite differently. R&C  costs tend to be
technologically  determined and  standardized, depending on quality of service and number  of
accounts. Passive investment costs are also technologically determined, depending on volume
and  allocation  of  assets. Active investment costs are market-determined, stemming  from  the
premium  that  a  manager  who  is  deemed  to  be  superior  can  command  in  a  market  for
differentiated  investment  skills.  Marketing  expenses  usually  go  together  with  active
management, since they are used to sell the skills of a particular asset manager, and they depend
on profit-maximizing calculations about costs versus returns of incremental marketing activities.
In comparing costs across funds or systems and trying to ascertain how these are likely to
change in the future,  it is necessary to  take  into account the main  arguments  of the  fund's
production function-the  volume of  assets and  the number of accounts that  determine costs.
Looking simply at current costs can be misleading as an indicator of efficiency or long run costs,
in comparing systems of different sizes or stages of development.
Table 1 illustrates the total administrative cost and its breakdown between R&C and INV
in two hypothetical systems, as they evolve through time. Two cost measures are used--dollars
per account and basis points per unit of assets (1 basis point = .01%). The first measure is useful
because it tells us how much it costs to operate an account for an average worker, while the
second measure tells us how much gross returns are being whittled away by administrative costs.
While economies of scale are probable (see James and Palacios  1995, Mitchell 1998), in this
6section, for expositional purposes, we assume that R&C cost per account and INV cost per unit
of assets are constant and start-up costs are incurred in the first three years.
Panel A  illustrates a  stylized cost profile  for an IA system that uses the institutional
approach,  with  passive  investing  that  costs  .1%  of assets  annually,  R&C  costs  of  $20  per
account. Panel B does the same but increases the gross annual contribution from $520 to $2020.
Panel C illustrates the retail approach, with marketing plus investment expenses totaling 1.1% of
assets, R&C costs $30 per account. We see that cost per account and  per unit of assets change
over time, and in a given year differences appear between these systems, even if they are equally
efficient:
1.  Start-up costs greatly accentuate total cost in the early years.
2.  Costper  account starts relatively low and rises through time as average account size grows,
due to  increased investment and/or marketing costs.
3.  Cost as a % of assets starts high and falls as average account size grows, due to constant
R&C costs per account; scale economies in asset management would accentuate this effect.
4.  R&C costs dominate at the beginning but their impact on net returns become much smaller in
the long run, when investment and marketing costs dominate.
5.  A higher contribution rate leads to a faster build-up of assets, and a lower cost as % of assets,
even if two systems are equally efficient (Panel A v. B).
6.  An expensive investment and marketing strategy, as in the retail market, increases cost per
unit of assets and leads to faster growth in cost per account and per unit of assets, while the
institutional approach keeps these costs low, both in the short and long run (Panel B v. C).
If we apply this production function approach across countries, in attempting to evaluate
the  cost-effectiveness  of  different  systems,  additional  problems  arise  because  wages,
7infrastructure and  productivity  vary  widely. If  the  relevant technologies  tend to  be  capital-
intensive,  then capital-rich countries  with  relatively cheap  capital will  have lower  costs  per
account  and  asset unit,  while the  opposite  is true  if the  feasible  technology  set  uses  labor
intensively, especially unskilled labor. Funds that operate in countries with a facilitating legal
and physical infrastructure, such as enforceable contract rights and telephone lines that work,
will be able to use their own labor and capital more productively. Regulations that vary across
countries also influence the feasible production function. Data gaps do not allow us to control for
differences  in  types  and  quality  of  service,  which  therefore  become  part  of  the  "random"
variation.
While we have been defining costs to the fund and the system, costs (fees) to consumers
may vary from this. In the short run, at the start-up of a new system, funds may run temporary
losses, in  the expectation  that they will increase their  market  share and  recoup their  capital
expenses later on. In the medium term, they may eam profits, that offset the earlier losses. Thus
fees over time might be smoother than costs over time.
We would expect that in the long run competition will eliminate pure profits, so fees will
just  cover fund costs. But the existence of marketing competition, as well as potential skill and
wage differentials across asset managers, makes it difficult to predict the cost and fee level at
which  this  zero-profit  equilibrium  will  occur.  New  computerized  technologies  may  reduce
variable costs in the long run but raise fixed costs in the short run. New financial instruments
may increase benefits but also transactions costs as well as cost differentials across managers and
funds. And  oligopolistic profits  may remain  if  scale economies  are large relative  to  size  of
market.  Moreover,  price  discrimination,  used  to  recover  fixed  costs  when  heterogeneous
consumers have different price elasticities, means that cost may have different relationships to
8price for different groups of investors. In this paper we presume that in the long run fees will
bear a close relationship to real costs, and costs depend on how the system is organized.
The  retail  market  for  IA's  incurs  R&C  costs  for  many  small  accounts,  expensive
investment strategies  may  be  chosen,  and  marketing  costs  are often high  (as  in  Panel  C).
Proponents  of  centralized  funds  point  to  the  cost  advantages  that  stem  from  lower  R&C,
investment  and  marketing  expenses.  We  argue,  and  provide  supporting  evidence,  that  by
operating in the institutional market, an IA system may achieve most of the cost advantages of
centralized  funds  but  with  greater  political  insulation  and  responsiveness  to  workers'
preferences.  The  institutional approach aggregates  many small accounts  into large blocs  of
money and negotiates investment fees on a group basis, thereby keeping costs and fees low  by:
Cutting STARTUPCOST by avoiding excess capacity
Minimizing MARKETING cost;
Constraining worker choice to portfolios and strategies with low INV costs
Using increased bargaining power to shift costs and reduce oligopoly profits.
R&C expenditures may also be organized to cut costs and facilitate compliance,  although we
have less evidence on this.
When these strategies are utilized, the cost to workers of an IA system are in the same
neighborhood as a centralized system, but with greater competition and choice, which are the key
elements of a privately managed funded pillar.
II. How High are Administrative Fees in Latin America and How are They Spent?
In this section we examine costs and fees charged by individual account systems in Chile
and  other  Latin  American  countries.  These  fees  have  been  subject  to  great  criticism  by
opponents of IA systems. AFP fees do not necessarily represent real costs nor do they represent a
9long term commitment. AFPs in Chile (and other Latin American countries) made losses in the
early years  of the new  system because  of large fixed and  start-up costs that  exceeded their
revenues; but the industry has been quite profitable in recent years. We might expect competition
to  eliminate  these  profits  but  price  insensitivity  among  investors  may  prevent  this  from
happening quickly. Deregulation and increasing oligopoly may alter costs and their relationship
to  fees  in  the  future,  in  ways  that  are  difficult  to  predict.  For  example,  in  an  industry
characterized by differentiated competition, marketing costs play a large role and we don't  know
whether they will increase or decrease as the industry grows more concentrated.  As regulations
are liberalized, portfolio  diversification increases and managerial skill is deemed increasingly
important, this may raise managerial wages, marketing costs and fees. Despite this uncertainty
about the future, the current fee structure poses costs to investors that reduce their net returns, so
we take them as given and examine their implications in this section.
Costs and Fees in Latin America Across Time, Countries and AFP's
Tables 2  and 3 presents  information about aggregate  fees, costs  and their  impact  on
member accounts for AFP systems in a variety of Latin American countries in  1998. Table  4
presents a longer time series for Chile, on which we have data since 1982.
Most Latin American countries have adopted the Chilean method of charging fees: the
fee is  imposed  when the  contribution first  enters the  system,  and  no  management  fees  are
charged on that contribution thereafter. In Chile the fee started at over 20% of contributions but
has now fallen to an average level of  15.6% (and possibly less for the many workers who are
said to get unofficial rebates). Table  2 shows that in other Latin American countries,  such as
Argentina and Mexico, fees are still 20% of contributions or even higher. In Bolivia, which is
10experimenting with an  institutional approach to administrative costs, they are lower.  Table  3
shows that in systems that are still I their early years, these fees do not even cover full cost.
Besides the problems inherent in cost comparisons across countries that were  listed in
Part I, additional problems appear in Latin American, where the allocation of fees and expenses
between administration, insurance and other AFP activities is not always clearcut. In Argentina
the  division between  insurance and  administrative costs may be  arbitrary,  and  in  Colombia
additional  revenues  are  obtained  from  the  management  of  unemployment  insurance  and
voluntary insurance. Generally only contributors pay fees although non-contributing affiliates
also generate costs and the ratio of contributors to affiliates varies across countries. Nevertheless,
some  effects are  striking. While initially  the differences among countries may  appear to  be
random, upon closer examination clear patterns emerge.
1.  New systems are characterized by high start-up costs--until a sharp drop occurs around year
four. This helps account for the higher expenses outside of Chile in 1998.
2.  Thereafter,  cost  per  account  climbs  gradually  due  to  the  increased  investment  costs
associated with larger assets, while cost per unit of assets falls as the constant R&C costs per
account  are spread  over  a  larger  asset base.  Figures  1 and  2  demonstrate  the negative
relationship between cost per unit of assets and average account size implied by these tables--
except for Bolivia which has a much lower expense ratio than would be expected. In contrast,
Mexico--which is one of the newest systems with the smallest account size--has the highest
expense ratio relative to assets in the region. We would expect Mexico's cost per account to
rise but its cost per unit of assets to fall as its system matures.
Costs and Fees in Chile
11Chile, which has by far the largest account size due to its age and contribution rate, has
the smallest expense ratio per unit of assets. In Chile in 1998, using the official exchange rate for
conversion, the average account size was $5000 per affiliate and $10,000 per contributor, cost
per affiliate and contributor were $59 and $112, respectively, and fees somewhat higher. (All
these numbers are two to three time higher if PPP conversion rates are used). While fees per
account have been rising, as a percentage of assets they have fallen sharply--from over 9% in
1982 (much like Mexico today) to  1.36% in  1998 (much like the US  mutual fund  industry
today).
Table  5A  presents  the  results  of  a  simple  regression  analysis  that  sums  up  this
relationship between aggregate assets, costs and fees for the Chilean system over time. Start-up
costs and assets alone explain 96-98% of the variance in costs and fees across time. Very high
correlations among assets, affiliates and contributors together with small sample size preclude
the inclusion of more than one variable in this analysis of aggregate costs.
However, when we  disaggregate by AFP as well  as by year,  larger sample  size and
greater variation is introduced that allows us to decompose total costs and fees into their major
determinants-assets  and affiliates-and  to explore potential scale economies. Table 5B presents
the results of a panel data (fixed effects) analysis of Chilean AFP costs,  1982-98, using these
independent variables, and showing how the system has evolved through time. We see there that:
1)  Start-up fees and, even more, start-up costs in the first three years of operations were high.
2)  As number of affiliates grows, (R&C) costs and fees grow en toto and relative to assets.
3)  As assets grow, (investment) costs and fees grow, en toto and per account, but costs and fees
as a % of assets, which ultimately determine net return, decrease-due  to scale economies.
124)  Scale economies are further demonstrated by the fact that affiliates and assets both have a
coefficient of less than 1, singly and summed, in the logged regressions on total costs; but the
negative term (although insignificant) in  the quadratic implies  that these scale economies
may eventually come to an end. Calculations using these coefficient suggest that this occurs
when the AFP has about 3 million affiliates and US$15 billion-half  of the current Chilean
market.
Mergers  have  indeed  been  occurring.  We  can  expect  that  Chile,  Mexico  and  other  Latin
American countries will benefit further from maturation and scale economies in the future, so
their future costs will be lower than present costs for that reason.
Implications  of Front-Loaded Fees: how to convert them into annualizedfees
Charging  fees  based  on  new  contributions  is  an  extremely  front-loaded  method  as
compared with the customary practice in mutual funds of charging an annual fee based on assets.
Such a fee basis has a different impact on returns depending on how long the worker will keep
his  or her money in the system, which in tum  depends on the age and career pattern  of the
worker. For  comparability, we  have converted  the  15.6% front-loaded  fee in  Chile  into an
equivalent annual fee based on assets that will yield the same final year accumulation (Table 6).
This tells us how much, effectively, gross investment returns are being reduced each year and it
enables us to compare it with fees charged by mutual funds and other financial institutions. This
simulation assumes that the same fee schedule remains in  effect over  the worker's  lifetime,
although of course there is no guarantee that this will be the case. If a worker contributes only for
her first 20 years of employment the equivalent average annual fee for all her contributions is
.57%, while if contributions are made only in the last 20 years, the equivalent average annual fee
is 1.65% (column 2). For a worker who contributes every year for 40 years, paying a fee on each
13new  contribution,  the  annual  equivalent  of all  these  front-loaded  fees  is  .76%  (column  3).
Suppose that one half of all workers contribute for 40 years, and one quarter each for their first
and last twenty years. The system-wide annual expense ratio that is equivalent to the 15.6% fee
on contributions would then be .94%, almost 1% of assets per year.
A front loaded fee means that workers with different employment histories will end up
paying different annual equivalents as a subtraction from their gross returns, even if they impose
the same real cost on the fund. Front-loading of fees may induce evasion among workers in their
later years, since they can avoid all investment costs on accumulated assets if they simply stop
making  new contributions.  It may  induce AFP's  to  reject transfers  from older workers  with
larger assets and investment costs. Thus, front loads may not be desirable in the start-up phase of
a mandatory system because of their distributional impact and may not be sustainable in the long
run if AFPs are pennitted to change their fee structure, but they are frequently used, perhaps as a
device to help AFP's cover their costs, which are also front-loaded.
Comparison Between Chilean AFP Fees and Mutual Fund Fees
Annualized Chilean  fees are  similar to  fees of mutual  funds that  operate  in  the U.S.
domestic market (Part III).  American mutual funds, because they are voluntary, cater to a higher
socio-economic group and provide much greater diversification and service than Chilean AFPs,
which would make their costs higher.  But they also benefit from much greater economies of
scale and better infrastructure, which would make their costs lower.  AFP costs are much lower
than costs of U.S. mutual funds that operate in emerging markets.  They are much lower than
mutual fund fees for voluntary saving in Chile which, during the early 1990's, averaged around
6% per year for equity funds and 2% for bond funds, plus entrance and exit charges (Maturana
and Walker 1999). AFP fees are also lower than those of mutual funds in most other countries,
14where  the combination  of front loads and annual  fees exceeds levels in the U.S.  Chilean  AFPs
are therefore relatively inexpensive  if the standard of comparison  is fees in other diversified
mutual funds that invest individuals' savings. However,  they are more expensive  than savings
accounts  in commercial  banks, either  in Chile or elsewhere  (Valdes  1  999b).
The breakdown  of costs among AFPs shows that over 45% of total expenditures  were
used for marketing  costs, especially  sales commissions. This proportion  is similar to marketing
expenses in the retail financial  markets in the U.S. and other countries. In both countries  the
number would probably  exceed 50% if we included  staff salaries  involved  in marketing. These
similarities  suggest that a study of US mutual  fund data will yield insights  into how costs might
evolve  in IA systems  and how these costs  might be reduced-e.g. by reducing  marketing  costs.
Finally,  AFP fees are much higher than fees paid by institutional  investors  and they have
a substantial  impact  on ultimate  pension  amounts.  This leads one  to wonder  whether  it is possible
to organize a mandatory  system so that it captures the lower costs and higher benefits of the
institutional  market,  and if so, what are  the trade-offs?
1II. Costs in the Retail Market of American Mutual Funds
The mutual fund in the U.S. has been a hugely successful  retail financial institution.
Assets have grown from less than one billion dollars in 1949  to almost $140 billion in 1980  to
over $4 trillion  by the end of 1997  and now exceed the combined  total of savings bank deposits
and life insurance  assets (Pozen 1998).  Each mutual  fund investor  has an individual  account,  that
can be transferred from fund to fund, so this might provide information  on how an IA system
would operate  in a competitive  retail  market.  An earlier  paper analyzed  the determinants  of these
fees and the cost structure  that underlies  them. We used regression  analysis  and frontier analysis
based  on a large data set of mutual  funds (4254 funds  in 1997  and 1300-2000  each year for 1992-
is96),  as  well  as  information  culled  from  annual  reports,  surveys  conducted by  mutual  fund
associations, and discussions with fund officials. In this section we summarize these results and
consider the policy implications for a reformed social security system that includes individual
accounts (For a fuller account and numerous references see James and others 1999).
Costs  and Fees in the Mutual Fund Industry
In the US mutual fund industry, the fund pays annual fees to its investment adviser and
distributor (which is usually the same group or "sponsor" that set up the fund originally), and
much smaller fees  to lawyers, auditors, transfer agents and others. The charges are allocated
among shareholders proportional to  their  assets  and determine the  fund's  reported  "expense
ratio" that it subtracts from its gross return to obtain the net return passed on to shareholders. In
addition,  for  many  funds  front-loaded  and  back-loaded  commissions  are  paid  directly  by
individual investors to brokers or other sales agents upon purchase or sale; these entry and exit
fees are part of the price to relevant shareholders although not received by the fund.  Brokerage
fees paid by the fund for securities transactions are also excluded from the expense ratio but are
costs to shareholders, netted out of the fund's reported gross returns.
We have constructed a "total investor cost ratio" which equals the reported expense ratio
plus average brokerage (trading) costs and annualized front loaded sales commissions (Table 7).1
In  1997 the total investor cost was 1.85% of assets, compared to the reported expense ratio of
1.28%.  Weighted by assets, the total and reported numbers fall to 1.43% and .91% (or $360 and
$228 per account), respectively. Asset-weighted numbers are more relevant for our purposes.2
Most funds are members of a mutual fund complex (e.g. Fidelity and Vanguard).  Certain
activities, such as advertising,  research, new product development, are jointly  supplied to  all
members of the complex by the common investment adviser.  The allocation of these expenses
16among the funds may be influenced by estimates of where the expenses can be absorbed with
least  loss of  clients.  Thus, the  relative  fees  paid  by  members  of  a  fund  complex  do  not
necessarily reflect the real cost of producing them. For example, small and new funds that  are
expensive to run may be allocated only a small share of costs to attract new customers, and index
funds that are marketed to cost-conscious consumers may similarly be allocated a small share.
Business strategy concerning joint  cost allocation may be different in a mandatory IA system.
These caveats should be kept in mind as we analyze fund costs below.
We conducted a regression analysis designed to  explain the "expense  ratio"-reported
expenses (excluding trading fees and loads) as a percentage of assets.  (We did not use the "total
investor cost ratio" as our dependent variable because reliable data were not available for holding
periods by fund or on brokerage costs for many funds in the data set). We sought to determine
the extent to which cost variation is random or systematic, to identify the factors that determined
the  systematic  variation,  and  to  assess  the  implications  for  IA  systems.  We  ran  the  OLS
regressions separately for each year, 1992-97 and also conducted a frontier (envelope) analysis
for 1992-97.  Tables 8 reports results from the OLS regression for 1997 and Table 9 reports the
frontier analysis for 1992-97. The regressions in Table 8 explain 64% of the variance when all
the above variables are included. Most of the variance in costs is therefore systematic rather than
random.  Costs faced by investors vary in large part because of business choices made by fund
managers  and  these  same  costs  could  be  substantially  influenced  by  policy  choices  in  a
mandatory IA system. Our major empirical findings and their implications for IA systems:
Considerable evidence of economies of scale and scope
Expense ratios fall when total assets in fund, assets in the entire fund complex, and assets
per shareholder increase. A simple cross-tabulation shows that funds with assets of less than $ 10
17million have an average expense ratio  of 1.6%, while for those with assets of $1 to 10 billion it
is .96% and for more than $20 billion it is .6%. While all funds need industry analysts, portfolio
managers, computers and access to electronic trading facilities, large funds can be managed with
a relatively small increase in total resources. But these economies from asset aggregation do not
continue indefinitely.  The positive sign on the coefficient of Asset 2 in the regressions eventually
halts  the  fall  in  expense  ratio.  Thus,  aggregation  brings  economies  that  lead  to  industry
concentration, but the limit to these economies nevertheless leaves space for  multiple mutual
funds  (and pension funds), the exact number depending on the total market size of each country.
Significantfixed  costs per account
Holding  aggregate  assets  constant,  the  expense  ratio  increases  with  number  of
shareholders and decreases as average account size rises. The basic reason, as discussed in Part I,
is that funds incur a fixed cost per account for  record-keeping and shareholder communication
(R&C),  and the larger each  account the smaller  this cost will be,  as a percentage  of  assets.
According to these regressions  and corroborating  evidence from periodic  surveys of transfer
agents (the organizations which provide these services for mutual funds), average R&C costs per
account are $20-25. Fixed costs of R&C pose a potential problem for IA systems if the accounts
are small. These fixed  costs help explain the high expense ratios  of new AFPs  in developing
countries. This raises the question of whether an investment option with lower R&C costs should
be used or whether R&C costs should be amortized over a long time period,  to avoid imposing a
heavy burden on early cohorts, when new IA systems'  are started.
High marketing costs
Using  brokers,  other  sales  persons  and  mass  advertising  methods,  the  industry  has
successfully called to the attention of potential shareholders the advantages of equity investing,
18using mutual funds as the vehicle. The major marketing expense to shareholders consists of sales
commissions.  Two thirds of all funds are sold through third parties (brokers, insurance agents,
financial planners) who receive some kind of commission (through front or deferred loads or
annual  12bl  fees).  And most  of these sales commissions are passed  on to  consumers.  If we
define the "total annual marketing cost" paid by  the shareholder as the 12bl  fee + annualized
front load, it is .61%--around 43% of all fund expenses (Table 10). This is very similar to the
marketing proportions in Chile's AFP system. From a social point of view, marketing probably
provides  a  mixture  of  useful  information,  misleading  information,  an  impetus  to  good
performance, and zero-sum game raiding. Other studies have shown that the funds which have
gained the most are those that combine vigorous marketing with good performance (Sirri and
Tufano 1997). The possibility of spreading favorable information by marketing probably acts as
a  spur to  good performance and product innovation. But most methods to  keep IA  costs low
involve a reduction in marketing expenses, under the assumption that much of it is zero-sum and
not the most efficient way to provide useful information to new investors.
Lower expense ratios for  institutionalfunds
A small number of mutual funds are limited to  institutional investors (i.e. bank  trust
departments, corporations, small foundations). These funds have a significantly lower expense
ratio as compared with  funds for individual investors. The same assets can be  amassed with
much lower distribution, communication and record-keeping expenses from one large institution
than  from  numerous  small  individuals.  Institutions  are  much  less  likely  to  pay  sales
commissions to brokers because they have more efficient ways of gathering information.  On the
rare occasions when they pay these fees, they obtain lower rates. As a result, the expense ratio of
institutional funds is .6% lower than that of other funds in the regressions and the total investor
19cost for institutional  funds is  less than half those  of retail funds  (Table  11). This led  us to
investigate the institutional market in greater detail, to determine whether IA 's were doomed to
have high expense ratios due to their small account size or could benefit  from  low expenses due
to the large aggregate amounts in the mandatory system.
Lower costs of passive management-for  some assets
Also important is the large significant negative sign on passively managed funds, known
as index funds, which do not have to pay the high fees that popular active managers command.
Passively managed funds mimic or replicate a  stated benchmark, such as the S&P 500 or the
Russell 2000. The manager does not engage in discretionary stock selection or market timing and
therefore cannot claim a fee for superior information or judgement. Index funds generally benefit
from low turnover,  which reduces the  expense ratio  as well  as brokerage  fees.  Their  high
correlation with the market (low nonsystematic risk) means that they are less likely to engage in
heavy marketing, more likely  to rely  on price  (cost)  competition. Controlling  only  for  asset
allocation, fees of passive funds are less than one-third those of actively  managed funds in the
retail  market (Table 11).
The low cost of index fumds  should be interpreted with some caution, however.  It could
mean that fund complexes view these funds as the products that are designed to capture price-
sensitive  consumers,  and  for  this  reason  they  may  allocate  much  of  their  joint  expenses
(advertising, new product development) to the other members of their complex. R&C charges
also tend to be less for passively than for actively managed funds; this may be a business strategy
decision rather than a reflection of real cost differentials.  The real cost savings to the economy
from index funds may therefore be overstated by our regression results, although they remain
real cost savings to individual investors. If index funds become a larger share of the total market,
20opportunities  for  cost-shifting may  decline. Finally, the  lower  costs of  index  funds are not
statistically significant for small cap and emerging market funds. IA systems in  large cap stock
and bond markets in industrialized countries can keep their costs down and increase their net
returns by using index funds,  but this may be less true of developing and transitional countries
where emerging markets and small cap stocks dominate.
Asset allocation: internationalfunds
Asset allocation has a major impact on costs. Bond funds have lower costs and small cap
funds have higher costs. Expenses are highest in international funds, especially emerging market
funds-as  a result of their smaller size, the greater difficulty in obtaining infonnation  in these
countries, their high bid-ask spreads,  transactions and custodial costs, currency hedging costs,
and the relative paucity of effective cost-saving passive investment opportunities. These factors
would also apply to local funds operating in emerging markets, although institutions based in a
country needn't hedge against currency risk and may have an informational advantage over those
that are based in a foreign country.  It follows  that IA systems in industrialized countries can
economize  on  costs  if  they  concentrate  investments  in  large  liquid  domestic  instruments;
international diversification comes at a cost. In contrast, the higher costs in developing countries
could be mitigated by international diversification, including the use offoreign  index  funds.
Net and gross returns
Of course, the investor ultimately cares about net returns, not the expense incurred  in
earning them.  If higher costs led to higher returns, they would be worth incurring.  However, a
large literature indicates that this is not the case (Elton and others 1993, Malkiel 1995, Malhotra
and McLeod  1997).  In  fact, some of the  same factors that  increased costs actually  reduced
returns during this period. Most important, in our sample larger assets increase  gross and net
21returns, but this effect stops after a point.  Funds with front loaded sales commissions don't  earn
higher gross returns, so their load-adjusted net returns are lower than for no-loads. Index funds
earn significantly more than actively managed funds over-all, particularly in the large cap stock
and bond markets, but this effect is absent in small cap, international and emerging market funds
(also see Muralidhar  and  Weary  1998, Shah and Fernandes  1999).  Institutional  funds have
higher net returns. These results from separate equations are consistent with the negative sign on
gross and net returns as control variables in our expense ratio equations.  Cost and net returns
appear to be negatively correlated.  Thus, strategies involving high administrative costs do not
seem justified on grounds that they raise returns.
Changes over time: Will  price competition reduce investor costs?
The question of whether expenses have been going up or down over time has been hotly
debated (see Lipper  1994).  This  is an important question because  it tells us whether policy
makers can rely on market forces to reduce costs. Between 1992 and  1997 a shift of investors
toward no-loads and a decrease in the size of front loads led to a small fall in the total investor
cost ratio, despite the rise in the reported expense ratio (Table 10).  Over a longer time period
(1980-97), the average investor cost ratio has fallen more substantially (by about one-third), for
the same reasons (Rea and Reid 1998).  But the picture remains mixed because total expenses
per account (expense ratio times average assets per account) have gone up dramatically over the
same period, primarily as a result of asset growth and secondarily as a result of the rise in non-
marketing expenses.  More recently, investors have been shifting into cheaper passively managed
funds, but in 1997 these still held only 6% of all assets.
The movement to lower cost and higher performing funds generally occurs through the
flow  of  new  money to  the  funds rather  than the  reallocation of  old  money.  The  process,
22therefore, has been very gradual and some poorly informed investors have not participated in it
(Ippolito 1992, Patel, Zeckhauser and Hendricks 1994, Sirri and Tufano 1997, Gruber 1996). It
appears that  in the short run we cannot count on competition to  bring price down for many
investors. Why is this the case? We hypothesize that competition through marketing rather than
through price cuts may be a consequence of high volatility and the resulting high noise-to-signal
ratio that makes it difficult for investors to distinguish between random luck versus systematic
skill and low costs until many years of observations have elapsed (for a mathematical example,
see James and others  1999). Funds spend on marketing, pointing to their lucky returns, rather
than cutting costs and  price. This poses a problem for  IA systems, as an entire generation of
workers may pass through the system before low cost, high performing funds  are identified. The
difficulty new investors have in processing financial  information exacerbates this situation. An
IA system that constrains investments to funds  with low nonsystematic risk will encourage price
competition relative to marketing competition, because such funds  will be able to demonstrate
their  cost-based  superiority  more  quickly  than funds  with  greater  fund-specific  volatility.
(Reduced differentiation andfund-specific  volatility may help explain why fees  in Chilean AFPs
are somewhat lower than fees in US mutualfunds,  on average).
IV. Costs in the Institutional Market
Although small institutions invest through special low cost institutional mutual  funds,
large institutions (e.g. DB plans of major corporations) do not invest through mutual funds that
must treat all shareholders equally. They can get better asset management rates elsewhere.
How Much do Institutional Investors Pay  for Asset Management?
Table  12 presents illustrative cost data on costs of money management provided by a
large manager of institutional funds operating outside the mutual fund framework.  It also shows
23median costs for  167 large and  10 of the largest U.S. pension  funds These rates  show clear
evidence of scale economies and the cost efficiency of passive management.
Fees as a percentage of assets decline over  large ranges with volume of assets managed.
Marginal fees are as low as 1 basis point for passive management of large cap stocks and 2.5
basis points for small and mid-caps, once assets in an account reach $200 million. Fees for active
management are higher, but still far less than mutual fund rates.  For large cap domestic equity
exceeding $25  million, investors pay  35-50 basis points. Not  surprisingly, fees  for emerging
market  investments  are much higher than for domestic  investments, but  advantages  to  large
institutional  investors remain.  Despite the sliding fee  scale, most  funds  use multiple  money
managers and allocate less than a billion dollars on average to each active manager, evidence that
diversification benefits eventually outweigh scale economies. There appears to be no strong cost
reason for aggregating assets per manager beyond a billion dollars.
If we add to these asset management costs another 3-10 basis points for brokerage fees
and internal administrative costs that are incurred by large institutions, this brings the total cost
to .04-.65%, depending on investment strategy. These numbers from large US pension funds are
roughly consistent with numbers from occupational pension plans in the UK, Switzlerland and
South Africa, and from "industry funds" in Australia, all of which cost between  .4 and .6% of
assets for large DB and DC plans in which workers have no choice of investment manager. 3
Why do Institutions  Get Better Rates?
In an imperfectly competitive market, large investors have greater reasons and resources
to seek out asset managers who will provide good performance at low cost. They are better able
to separate noise from signal, to evaluate whether a particular fee is warranted by the expected
returns,  and therefore to  respond sensibly  to price differentials. They are more  likely to  use
24passive  investment strategies. They also have the credible threat of managing their money in-
house if they do not get good terms from an external manager. An "all or nothing" bargaining
strategy for a large money bloc enables them to capture potential oligopoly profits or a fee that
approaches marginal cost if this is less than average because of fixed costs.
Besides the greater information and bargaining power of institutional investors, they also require
lower R&C and marketing costs by the asset manager. It is easier and less labor-consuming for
the asset manager to deal with the financial staff at a few large institutions than with numerous
small uninformed households. To reach the individual retail investor, advertising expenses must
be  incurred, numerous brochures and  statements sent to households, and often commissioned
salespersons are involved. In contrast, marketing in the institutional market-place is likely to
consume less resources because of the concentration of investors, their greater financial expertise
and price sensitivity. Commissions are rarely paid. And, once the contract is secured only one
investor need be served in the institutional market.  Even if the billion dollar investor gets better
service  than  the thousand  dollar investor  (as  is  likely the  case),  total  marketing  and  R&C
demands relative to assets are much smaller for one institution than for a million small investors.
These factors lead to costs for institutional investors as low as .04-.65% of assets, depending on
asset category and investment strategy chosen. This is much lower than retail costs ranging from
.3% to 1.5% for the average passively and actively managed mutual fund, respectively.
V. Capturing Institutional Rates for a Mandatory IA System: Constrained Choice
Mandatory  IA  systems  can  also  be  structured  to  obtain  scale  economies  in  asset
management without high marketing costs, by  operating through  the institutional  market.  In
other words, they can offer workers an opportunity to invest at much lower cost than would be
possible on a voluntary basis. To accomplish this requires aggregating numerous small accounts
25of  a  mandatory  system  into large  blocks  of money and  negotiating  fees  for the  investment
function on a group or centralized basis. Competition takes place in two stages. In the first stage,
a competitive bidding process might be used to limit entry to asset managers charging the lowest
fees subject to performance specifications. 4 Limited entry avoids high start-up costs in the early
years of a new system. Low fees create a disincentive for high marketing expenses. In the second
stage workers choose from among funds that won the primary competition. The lowest fees are
obtained when worker choice  is constrained to  low cost investment portfolios and  strategies,
such  as  passive  investment.  Still,  enough  choice  could  be  retained  to  satisfy  individual
preferences  and avoid political  control. With R&C  costs of  .1% of assets  (as in the average
mutual fund in Table 7 and as calculated for an IA system with small contributions in Table  1),
and with investment costs as given above for institutions, an "institutional" IA system would cost
.14-.75% of assets in the long run (James et al 1999).
Several  countries  are  now  experimenting  with  variants  of  this  approach.  The  three
institutional IA systems described below all operate within this fee range and imply some trade-
off of political insulation and individual freedom for the cost reduction.  We start with the most
constrained system, in Bolivia, that is appropriate for a small developing country, and conclude
with the  Swedish system, that  offers  considerable choice  among existing  funds, mimics  the
institutional  market  through  a  sliding  scale  of  price  ceilings,  and  is  more  appropriate  for
countries with advanced financial markets. We describe the cost savings that seem achievable, as
well as the pitfalls of these schemes.
Auction  Off Entry Rights to a Single Portfolio: Bolivia
In 1997 Bolivia auctioned off the asset management rights in its new defined contribution
pillar to two investment companies, in a widely publicized international bidding process.  At the
26start of the new system it was expected to have 300,000 participants, each contributing 10% of
wages into their retirement accounts, bringing total annual contributions to $300 per account or
almost $90 million en toto. Initially almost all of the assets had to be invested in government
bonds, to help finance the transition, but over time the funds were expected to diversify.
The  bidding process  for management rights  consisted of  two  stages that  began  with
notices in the Wall Street Journal, Financial Times and Pensions and Investments and proceeded
via  extensive internet communications, facilitating international competition. A web  site was
established to exchange documents such as draft law and regulations, proposed contracts  and
other data. Initial selection criteria included: experience in asset management (at least 10 years of
global  asset  management,  at  least  $10  billion  in  assets  under  management);  experience  in
pension fund administration and record-keeping (at least 100,000 accounts); and experience in
establishing new systems. Reacting to this publicity, 73 asset managers expressed interest,  12
consortia (including 25 separate companies) applied and 9 were selected to bid. At the bidding
stage, the managers competed with respect to asset management fee and conditions regarding
guarantees  and  regulations  were  added. Concerns  about  possible  guarantees  that  might  be
required and the government's  insistence that in the early years  the AFP's  must  invest most
incoming revenues in Treasury bonds led only three managers to submit bids at this stage.
The  bidding  process  specified  that  a  uniform  fee  of  .5%  of  salary  (5%  of  net
contributions) would be imposed, and companies bid on the size of their additional asset-based
fee. In the end, the lowest bidder offered to charge 22.85 basis points of the first billion dollars
under management,  1.4 basis points  on the next $.2 billion,  .67 basis points on the next $.3
billion and no management fee on assets above US$1.5 billion-strong  evidence of the  scale
economies in asset management noted above. The second bidder quickly adopted this schedule,
27thereby ending the bidding process. (Another 20 basis points is paid to Citibank, which serves as
international custodian for all the funds; in Chile custodial fees are covered by the AFP's).
Both  winners  consortia consisted of  international consortia that  included  foreign and
domestic partners: Invesco-Argentaria and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya S.A.-Prevision. Their contract
runs for 5 years. Initially workers were assigned to a company and no switching was permitted.
Starting in the year 2000, urban workers will be allowed to  switch and new workers will be
permitted to choose. After the five-year contractual period additional companies will be allowed
to enter and the price caps will be lifted. (von Gersdorff 1997 and Guerard and Kelly 1997).
Why  were  international companies  so interested in  a  small  pension  fund  in  a  small
country? The same companies that run the new defined contribution pillar will also manage the
$1.65 billion proceeds of a privatization program (an amount which is equal to 22% of Bolivia's
GNP). Pension reform and state enterprise reform were undertaken simultaneously in Bolivia
and management rights to the two sets of assets were auctioned off jointly. In addition to the fees
paid by workers, the companies will receive a fee of .2285% of privatization assets, which will
roughly double their revenues in the early years. Given that 5% of  pension contributions equals
$15 per  year, which  could barely cover R&C costs, cross-subsidies from the management  of
privatization  assets  could  well be  involved.  It  is  likely  that  bidders  would  have been  less
interested and initial costs paid by workers in the IA system would have been higher without the
presence of large privatization assets. But they probably would have been lower  if the same
scenario were  repeated in a country with better financial markets  and infrastructure. In other
countries, bidders might  be attracted because of  complementarity with desired insurance  and
banking markets.
28The Bolivian system is designed to keep average costs and fees low in the early years by
reducing fixed costs and excess capacity since only two companies are operating; decreasing
marketing and record-keeping costs since each company is given an initial monopoly for a group
of  workers and transfers  are not  allowed; amortizing infrastructure costs over  several years,
during  which  each  company  has  an  assured market  share;  and  increasing  information  and
bargaining power since the government bargains on behalf of the entire system when fees are
established in the contract. Was this  accomplished? Initially fees in  Bolivia are only  .5% of
wages (5% of incoming contributions) plus .23% of assets plus .2% of assets for the custodian.
This produces a fee that is less than one-third that in Chile in the first year (3% of assets for
Bolivia in 1998 compared with 9.4% in Chile in 1982, see Tables 3 and 4). For workers who will
only be in the system for 20 years or less, Bolivia is clearly much cheaper than Chile.
However, the differential is expected to narrow over time as the asset-based component
grows. Under the current fee structure, a full-career worker who enters the system today would
pay the equivalent of .56% of assets per year over his lifetime, as compared with .76% in Chile.
Thus,  in  the  long  run,  given the  present pricing  structure, the  difference between  the two
countries  is about 20 basis  points.  (In the  absence of cost-saving  measures we  would  have
expected Bolivia to  be more expensive than Chile  due to  its smaller  size accounts and  less
developed infrastructure and financial markets, so these numbers understate the true saving).
Restricted entry has other pros and cons besides the impact on costs. One advantage of a
bidding process with only two or three winners, especially in small countries, is that for some
period it  provides  a  guaranteed market  share  that  may  entice international  companies  with
financial expertise to  enter the market. The established standards and practices of these firms
may, to some extent, substitute for regulatory capacity in countries where this is weak. At the
29same time, the extreme concentration opens the door to  corruption in the award of the initial
contracts, collusion between the two firms, and possibly control of the contract monitors by the
firms that it is supposed to regulate.  The firms may agree to buy government debt at low rates
rather than investing more broadly, in return for favorable regulatory treatment. The regulators
may have weak power relative to the power of two large investment companies that control the
market. The  two companies may also constitute a controlling share of the securities market in
Bolivia,  once  this  begins  to  develop  and  they  are  permitted  to  diversify;  this  is  a  threat
particularly  if  international  investments  are  not  allowed.  Thus,  this  system  is  not  as  well
insulated from political objectives and monopolistic distortions as a less concentrated  system
would be.
Another problem stems from the lack of incentives for service and to slow adaptability to
unforeseen contingencies, due to the incomplete nature of contracts. While certain service targets
were  set,  the  contract  cannot  specify  every  element  of  service  that  might  be  desired,  and
companies are likely to cut back on services that are not specified in order to  maximize their
profits while living within the contract. The fact that workers cannot switch companies initially
removes competitive pressures to perform well for those circumstances and services that are not
enumerated. Of course, the possibility of switches after three years, as well as the entry of new
firms after 5 years, means that long run contestability may prevent abuses of monopoly power.
But  it is  also  possible  that  political  pressures  from the  first  two  companies  may  lead  to  a
continuation of the restrictions on entry and switching. Moreover,  competition in Bolivia  has
been dampened by an unexpected development-the  merger of the parent companies of the two
winning bidders-which  in effect have become  one. Thus, the Bolivian approach keeps costs
low at start-up, but the impact on costs and performance in the long run is uncertain.
30One way to mitigate these problems is to maintain an auction process for the long run,
but with rebidding every 3-5 years on the basis of performance as well as fees. However, the
incumbent may have a big competitive advantage over potential newcomers, since it already has
affiliates and R&C files. To facilitate contestability, it may be desirable to separate the fixed cost
component of the operation (such as the R&C database) from the investment function, and to
permit  investment abroad, which will make the environment more inviting to asset  managers
from abroad.
With  these  caveats  in  mind,  the  limited  entry-by-bidding  approach  is  worth  serious
consideration, especially as a way to avoid excess capacity at the start-up of new systems and in
the longer run for countries that have modest contribution and asset bases.
Competitive Bidding with Portfolio Choice: TSP
In Bolivia the same portfolio (government bonds and bank deposits) is offered by both
funds. A less constrained variation on this theme uses a competitive bidding process to select a
limited number of varied portfolios,  and investment companies offering them, among which
workers can choose.  This  approach is employed by the  federal Thrift  Saving  Plan  (TSP), a
voluntary plan for civil service workers in the United States. It has been proposed as one possible
model that might be followed if the U.S. social security system were reformed to include IA's.  In
the TSP, contributions by workers are matched by their employer, the federal government, up to
a combined limit of 16%. Beginning with barely a million participants and $3 billion in assets in
1987, the TSP had  grown to  2.3 million participants  and $65 billion by  1998, with  average
annual contributions of $2600 and average account size of  $27,400 that far exceed the size of
other plans analyzed in this paper.
31In the TSP model, several benchmarks are selected and the right to run a fund through
passive  management  based on that  benchmark is auctioned off periodically  in  a competitive
bidding process. Initially only three portfolios were authorized--a money market fund that holds
short  term  government  securities,  a  fixed  income  fund  that  holds  medium  and  long  term
government and corporate bonds, and a common stock fund indexed to the S&P 500.  It is now
in the process of adding a small cap fund and an international stock fund (the voluntary market
provided  these  options  many  years  ago).  A  bidding process  is  held every  2-4  years,  with
prospective managers evaluated on the basis of tracking ability, trading costs, fiduciary record
and  fees.  Workers  have  a  choice  among  these  funds  and  limited  switching  is  permitted.
However, the same investment company has been selected to run the stock and bond funds so
workers do not have a choice among investment companies. Moreover, the contract holder has
not changed over the lifetime of TSP, consistent with the "first mover"  advantage mentioned
above.
The TSP essentially operates as an institutional investor, passing the savings along to its
investors.  As  a result of  its  information and  bargaining power  as well as  its  use of  passive
management, investment costs (including trading fees) are only a few basis points. The largest
cost component, about $20 per account, is for R&C, which is carried out by a separate public
agency. (An alternative model might auction off the R&C function as well). While R&C costs
have been quite constant over time in dollar terms, investment costs have been rising with assets,
so total administrative costs are now $30 per account. As a percentage of assets, administrative
costs have fallen from .7% at the start-up of the system to .1  1% in 1998 (Table 13).
The fee is less than 10% of what workers would pay, on average, if they were given a
broad  choice of portfolios and chose the same mix as retail mutual  fund investors  (who pay
321.43% of assets, on average). It is about half of what they would have to pay in the retail industry
in the U.S. for similar funds (S&P index mutual funds are available for 21 basis points, including
trading costs). This cost is exceptionally low in part because contributions are passed on by a
single employer, the government, which also covers some additional communications costs. But
the biggest cost saving in TSP (a saving of 1.2% of assets per year compared with the average
mutual fund investment) comes from constraining the choice of investment strategy to domestic
passive management; countries that did not have such deep financial markets could not achieve
such large savings.  Small additional savings  (of .1% per  year) accrue to  TSP  from using  a
competitive bidding process  to  enhance  bargaining power,  secure better  rates  and  eliminate
marketing expenses.
The advantage of such a process: Workers have a clear-cut choice of investment portfolio
-but  choice  is  constrained  in  a  way that  is designed to  keep  fees  low  without  sacrificing
expected returns. This constraint may be a big advantage in an IA system where many small
account holders  are unaccustomed to evaluating multiple investment options, and  where  it is
important  to  avoid  a  high  implicit  contingent  government  liability.  The  disadvantages:  the
selection of portfolios is very limited, adaptation to change is slow dnd there is no competition.
Workers who want a risk-return trade-off that is different from that pennitted by the system's
governing  board  or  those  who  want  active  management  cannot  satisfy  their  preferences.
Investment in enhanced index funds, high-yielding but risky venture capital, private equity and
new financial instruments are completely ruled out. Competitive pressures for good performance
and innovation are limited once a portfolio is chosen since, for any given portfolio  (and even
across portfolios), there is no  choice of manager. These disadvantages could be mitigated  by
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funds for each benchmark.  The larger the asset base, the more feasible this becomes.
In developing countries where the pension system is a major source of long term capital,
financial markets are not efficient, and few attractive financial instruments and benchmarks are
available, a heavy concentration on passive investment may not be feasible or desirable. Thus, as
was the case with the Bolivian model, this approach is promising but must be used with caution.
Open Entry and Price Ceilings: Sweden.
Still greater product variety could be achieved, while retaining low fees,  by allowing
open entry subject to a price ceiling imposed by a central authority. Sweden recently established
an IA system using  this type  of approach. Five million workers  are expected to  participate,
contributing  2.5%  of  wages.  (This  funded  system  is  supplementary  to  a  large  unfunded
"notional" defined contribution pillar, to which workers contribute 16%). For a full time worker,
annual contributions will amount to $600 per year and about 16 billion kronor or $2 billion per
year are expected to flow into the system. Money began to accumulate in an unallocated pool in
1995, so when allocations to individuals and funds begin in 2000, total assets will be about $10
billion.
All mutual funds that operate in the voluntary market (several hundred funds) are free to
participate providing they agree to the net fee schedule set by the public agency that administers
the system (the PPM). Subject to this proviso, workers can select the fund of their choice. After
studying the industry's  production function to determine the size of fixed and variable costs, the
public  agency has just  promulgated the fee schedule that  it plans  to impose. It is  a complex
schedule that attempts to mimic the cost function and the  fee schedule that would be charged in
the institutional market. It depends on the expense ratio charged by the fund to the general public
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contributions  that it attracts in the mandatory  system (Table 14 and Figure 1).  A sliding scale
was used so that price would  track declining  marginal  and average  costs. It also cushions  the risk
of participation  for funds that are not sure they will attract a large volume of assets, thereby
encouraging  diversity,  while restricting  excess  profits from those  that are more successful  (MPIR
1998).
Mutual funds in the voluntary  market in Sweden  charge varying amounts ranging from
.4% to over 2%. As of 1997  the average  fee plus trading  commissions  was 1.5%, similar to the
U.S. (Dahlquist  et al 1999).  Funds will charge  the same fees in the mandatory  system,  but are
required  to pay a rebate to the PPM, which passes it back to workers. The rebate to the PPM is
higher for high cost funds and more popular funds. Funds that attract large sums from the
mandatory  system are left with a net marginal  fee of less than 20 basis points and a net average
fee of  20-30 basis points. Intensive  marketing  is likely to be ruled out by these fees since cost
would exceed incremental  net revenues.  These net numbers are roughly  similar to fees paid for
management  of domestic  assets  by large institutional  investors  in the U.S.
This method could not be used, however,  unless some other arrangements  were made to
cover R&C costs, for these costs will exceed the permissible  fees in the early years of the new
system.  Many mutual  funds would  be unwilling  to participate  if they had to cover  R&C expenses
out of their allowable  fee. The Swedish  system avoids  this problem by centralizing  collections,
record-keeping  and most communications--charging  all workers an additional  asset-based  fee to
cover  these costs (thereby  cross-subsidizing  low eamers) and amortizing  expenses  over a 15-year
period (thereby  spreading  fixed costs over many cohorts).  R&C costs are expected to be .3% at
the beginning, eventually dropping to .1%. To avoid the cost of setting up a new collection
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eventually  passed  on  to  the  PPM.  The  PPM  records  these  contributions,  aggregates  the
contributions of many individuals and moves them in omnibus  accounts to  the mutual  funds
chosen  by  workers.  Indeed,  the  funds  will  not  even  know  the  names  of  their  individual
members-a  procedure know as "blind allocations." All fund switches will be processed by the
PPM.  These  features  reinforce  the  bulk  buying  power  of  the  public  agency  and  further
discourage sales commissions.
The rebate collected from the funds is distributed back to the workers, according  to a
formula set by the PPM. One might expect (and high fee funds preferred) that the rebate would
go back to workers in the originating fund, on grounds that net price paid by workers would then
equal net fee received by fund, and both would approximate marginal cost. However, the  PPM
proposed (and low fee funds, that tend to be  associated with unions, preferred) to  give each
worker back the same amount (as a percentage of assets invested) regardless of which fund he or
she has chosen.  This would drive a wedge between net price paid by workers and received by
funds. Workers who chose low fee funds would get back far more than the rebate paid by their
fund, while workers in high fee funds would continue to pay high fees that their funds would not
keep. If the net fee received by each fund approximates its marginal cost (which is the intent),
the net price paid by consumers would differ from marginal cost and, in making their allocation
decisions, consumers would not be taking real marginal cost into account (Figure 1).
The PPM proposal, obviously, was opposed by the high  fee funds and their  potential
consumers. The net outcome, therefore, was a political compromise: part of the rebate will be
returned on a  group basis and part on an individual basis. Thus, the system will redistribute
across consumers in ways that are not obvious or obviously equitable. This controversy about
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price control systems are subject, sometimes at the expense of efficiency. It is not clear whether
this redistributive fee-cum-rebate schedule will prove to be politically sustainable.
The Swedish system also illustrates some of the pitfalls of a price control system  that
stem  from  the  difficulty  in  promulgating  an  efficient  and  equitable  fee  schedule  for  a
differentiated industry. Experience in other industries warns that "incorrect" prices may be set
and  quality deterioration may occur under price controls. For example, it remains to be  seen
which funds will be willing to enter the system under these terms. If the price has been set too
low, few if any funds would choose to participate. (In Kazakhstan a very low unstable fee ceiling
of  1%  of contributions  +  10% of investment returns has been set  and, partly  for this  reason,
participation by private investment companies is limited). 5 And those that do participate may
provide inferior service. While many funds appear to be interested in Sweden, the nature of the
participating companies will be skewed by the fee structure. Most likely bond, large cap and
index  funds  investing  in  Sweden  and  other  industrialized  countries  will  participate,  while
actively managed small cap and emerging market funds that have more expensive production
functions may be reluctant to join. Thus price controls are implicitly pushing the system toward
certain assets and toward passive investing, although these were not explicit goals at the outset.
How much is actually saved by this complex system? Under the current formula, the
average fee that will be paid by consumers and kept by funds depends on the distribution of
assets in the mandatory system, which is not yet known, since the system will start operating in
the year 2000.  Suppose, hypothetically, that the demand and  supply effects described  above
shape consumer choice so that 75% of all assets accrue to low fee funds while 25% of assets are
divided  equally  among the others.  Then, the  net average fee paid by consumers  (including
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in the voluntary market; total saving = .7% of assets. In the long run, as R&C costs fall, total
savings rise to 1% (Table 15).
As in the case of TSP, much of this potential saving is due to incentives that change the
mix of funds and shift consumers toward low cost funds. A smaller proportion is due to cost cuts
for the given funds, stemming from fee ceilings that discourage marketing expenses. A final
prtion of the lower fee is attributable to greater bargaining power of the PPM, which keeps price
in the mandatory sector close to marginal cost. The saving is not nearly as much as the TSP
achieves, mainly  because the Swedish fees are high enough to  accommodate greater  choice,
including  active  management.  Thus,  the  Swedish  model  would  be  a  possibility  for  other
countries  that want to  provide considerable choice  in their IA system, while also  achieving
modest cost reductions-but  the dangers of price ceilings discussed above are also real.
VI. Constrained Choice: Is It a Good Choice?
An over-arching characteristic of these approaches is constrained choice for the worker.
The government organizes the market and constrains choice in every mandatory system, albeit
with different objectives. In Chile and most other Latin American countries with decentralized
schemes,  pension  funds  must  abide  by  detailed  regulations  controlling  their  investment
portfolios,  designed to  reduce  financial market  risk  and regulatory  difficulty,  rather  than to
minimize costs. As a result, marketing costs are high and returns have not been maximized, but
potential disasters have been averted (Srinivas and Yermo 1999). Moral hazard problems have
potentially been reduced, thereby making government guarantees of benefits less costly.
The IA models used in Bolivia, Sweden and the TSP preserve private competitive fund
management  and  worker  choice,  but  choice  is  constrained  with  the  object  of  reducing
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the long run they will cut costs to less than .6% and in some cases to less than .2% of assets per
year (Table  15). If  gross returns are not affected negatively,  such fee reductions  could raise
pensions by 10-20% relative to the retail market.
To evaluate whether these cost and fee reductions are desirable, it is important to analyze
where they come from. We have identified three major sources: changes in investment portfolios
and strategies, lower costs of managing a given portfolio, and redistributing by cost-shifting and
cutting oligopoly profits. The first source has the largest impact on fees, especially in countries
with  efficient  financial  markets  and  passive  investment  opportunities.  The  second  source,
operating mainly by minimizing marketing and start-up expenditures, is available in developing
countries as well. Cost-shifting involves distributional trade-offs between long run and short run
fees  and between  fees  in the  voluntary and  mandatory  markets. The reduction  in  profits  is
probably the least important since, in many countries and in a global financial market, these will
be small anyway in the long run. Potential gains may also achieved by centralizing the R&C
function, although this is less clear.
Changes in portfolios
All three  cases severely limit the range of portfolios  available to workers, ruling out
"expensive" portfolios in assets such as small cap stocks and emerging markets and directing
workers toward index funds in liquid domestic instruments instead. Innovation and new product
development is discourage or ruled out. TSP does this most strongly and directly; about 90% of
its fee saving is attributable to this constraint on asset allocation. Sweden does it indirectly by
setting price ceilings that will restrict the supply of "expensive" funds and cross-subsidies that
will push demand toward cheaper funds. Developing countries such as Bolivia that lack well-
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saving.  (Of course, they also lack access to a wide set of financial instruments necessary for
diversified active investment; their portfolios are constrained mainly by availability). This may,
however, become an additional  rationale for the development of new instruments, more accurate
indexes, disclosure rules that will enhance market efficiency, and international diversification
using index funds (Shah and Fernandes 1999).
These constraints on asset classes are predicated on the assumption that the judgement of
many workers about the relationship between fund performance and fees is imperfect, and that
cost saving, which is certain, should take precedence over workers' expectations about returns,
which are highly uncertain, in a mandatory scheme. The evidence cited above supports the idea
that  many  small  investors  (and  even  large  investors)  are  poorly  informed.  Constraining
investment  choice  at  the  start  of  their  new  systems  facilitates  learning-by-doing,  which  is
probably the most effective form  of education, by limiting the mistakes people  can make.  It
makes government guarantees of benefits potentially less costly by diminishing moral hazard
problems.
But these restrictions decrease the adaptability for individual risk-return preferences to
informed workers as well as the fund's incentive to innovate and are therefore not an unmitigated
gain. The agents who set these restrictions may not always act in the workers'  best  interests.
Additionally, individuals may have a smaller sense of "ownership'  and a larger sense of being
taxed if their choice of investment strategies is constrained. The risk to the government of being
responsible for a bail-out in case of investment failure may be greater when it has "endorsed" a
small  number  of  investment  portfolios  and  managers.  These  dangers  can  be  alleviated  by
allowing greater choice, but at a cost in terms of higher price (Sweden versus TSP).
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All three cases achieve further economies by investing assets through the institutional
market to a limited group of companies and centrally negotiating fees for large money blocks. In
Bolivia  and the TSP a small number of slots for investment companies was set a  priori and
operating rights auctioned off to the lowest qualified bidder; price was determined through the
competitive bidding process. In Sweden a low price structure was pre-set by the public agency
and quantity of companies willing to accept these terms remains to be determined, but a small
number is expected to dominate the market. The low fees and limited entry dampen marketing
costs and excess capacity that might otherwise exist at start-up. Given the large fixed costs and
declining average costs in the industry, it will always be tempting for funds to  spend more on
advertising and sales commissions to increase their market share so long as the attainable fee is
higher than marginal cost. 6  When the fee is exogenously decreased, the incentive to  spend on
marketing will similarly decline and this helps to sustain the low fee.
As discussed earlier, marketing provides  both accurate and misleading information to
consumers, incentives for good performance and a large element of zero-sum game competition.
Reductions in marketing expenditures are efficient if the zero-sum game component is cut while
the useful information is not cut. It seems likely that the socially optimal amount of marketing is
less in a mandatory IA system than in the voluntary market. Since the total investable amount is
predetermined  by  law; marketing is not  needed to  induce people  to  save  or to  attract  these
savings to financial markets. While information is imparted by marketing, investment companies
and brokers have a clear incentive to impart misleading information that is in their interest rather
than the consumer's  interest. This could be a big problem in a new mandatory system with many
small inexperienced investors. In such a system it is important to provide other less biased, less
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incentives for good performance and  innovation imparted by marketing could continue to  be
provided in the voluntary market place. Reducing marketing expenses in the mandatory systems
may be more problematic in countries with low tax collection capacities and fewer alternative
sources  of  infornation,  particularly  those that  wish  to  use  marketing  as  a  tool  to  increase
coverage and reduce evasion.
Cost-shifting
The third source of the fee savings is due to cost-shifting and is mainly a short run and
distributional  effect: maintaining  the burden  of  fixed costs  in the  voluntary  rather  than the
mandatory systems and shifting part of the initial capital costs in a new system to later cohorts.
For example, in Sweden entry is open only to firms that operate in the voluntary market, the fee
schedule aims at charging marginal cost and a  15-year amortization period is being used  for
R&C by the public agency, while a private company would probably expect a positive return in
five years. Since the benefits of an IA system accrue disproportionately to younger generations,
who have more opportunity to accumulate savings, it seems reasonable that much of the fixed
costs  should  be  shifted  to  them  as  well-but  obviously  this  involves  a  value judgement.
Obtaining lower fees through an "all or nothing"  offer for large blocs in oligopolistic markets
likewise reduces price in the mandatory system without a corresponding impact on real resource
cost-it  shifts fixed costs to the voluntary sector or cuts oligopoly profits.
Centralizing collections and R&C: does this help?
The institutional approach is likely to imply centralized collections and record-keeping.
Centralized collections  enable money to be  aggregated and moved in large blocs  without the
identity of the worker  being disclosed and  centralized record-keeping allows  the investment
42function  to  be  more  contestable  in  the  rebidding  process.  Both  TSP  and  Sweden  separate
collection and R&C responsibilities from investment responsibilities and turn the former over to
a  central  agency.  In  Bolivia,  where  only  two  asset  managers  operate,  virtual  centralization
through  private  companies  has  been  achieved, but  this  has  not  been  separated  from  the
investment function. Is this desirable?
Besides  its role in making the rebidding process more contestable, centralized record-
keeping has other cost implications.  It facilitates economies of scale and standardization  and
avoids  the  compatibility  problems  that  could  arise  when  a  member  switches  funds  and
information systems. It  enables a  basic level of service to  be provided,  without competitive
pressures to upgrade to  a more costly level. Workers can more easily have multiple accounts
without multiple costly records and with the entire lifetime record in one place upon retirement.
Centralization also has a redistributive potential-it  permits a cross-subsidy to small accounts of
low earners, which may be deemed socially desirable in a mandatory scheme. But the downside
is the possibility that the central R&C office may have little incentive for accuracy and efficiency
if it has a monopoly.
Centralized collections  enable the IA  system to  piggyback on existing  tax collection
systems, hence  avoid the cost  of setting up a new collection system  and reduce  incremental
paperwork costs to employers. But piggybacking involves a large time-cost, hence opportunity
cost. An average of 9 months will pass in Sweden each year before the contributions will be
attributed to individuals and allocated to funds, during which time participants simply earn the
risk-free government rate. If the government rate is 3 percentage points lower than the rate that
investors would otherwise have earned, this opportunity cost is equivalent to a charge of 2.25%
43of contributions or .11% annually of assets.  We have not added this amount into our total cost
calculations but they should be borne in mind-the  advantages are not cost-free.
Centralized collections may also facilitate compliance since a  single collection agency
has  responsibility  for tracking  contributors  and therefore  for  identifying  evaders. Individual
pension funds have little incentive to report evaders, since they will simply lose a potential future
customer. But the centralized agency may also have little incentive, since it doesn't  keep the
money. The outcome here obviously depends on governance capacity and social norms and we
have little empirical evidence on real world outcomes.
Centralized collections and record-keeping may be handled through a public agency or
may be contracted out to a private company or clearinghouse in a competitive bidding process.
Croatia is attempting the latter approach. Using a public agency may not be  a good option for
countries that have weak tax collection mechanisms and distrust of government. For example,
this approach probably was not feasible in Chile at the start of its reform. Centralization via a
contracting process  has  the advantage of  introducing price  and  quality  competition  into  the
choice. The bidding process could be run by the government, or by an association of pension
funds in  order  to  make the  winner more  accountable to  them.  Even if  centralization  is  not
required  from  the start, the  system  is  likely to  move  in  that  direction if  sub-contracting is
permitted, due to scale economies. (Such sub-contracts are not permitted in Chile). Most mutual
funds in  the U.S.  (except the  largest fund complexes)  turn their  R&C  functions  over  to  an
external "transfer  agent"  and two  transfer  agents dominate the  entire  industry-evidence  of
natural market  adaptation to scale economies. Many Australian funds contract out the account
administration fumction to a few large R&C companies (Bateman 1999). We might expect such
procedures to develop in other mandatory pension systems, if they are permitted. The pros and
44cons of alternative R&C  arrangement obviously require further empirical study, as  countries
experiment with alternative systems.
Other caveats and pitfalls
The institutional approach to IA systems involves other caveats and pitfalls besides those
already mentioned. First of all, in a centralized competitive bidding process the "wrong" number
of firms may be chosen, resulting in over- or under-concentration relative to the least-cost point.
Or in  a system  of price  ceilings the wrong price may be chosen, resulting in  under-or over-
supply.
7 Second is the need to build performance incentives into the initial contract. It is likely
that whatever performance and service characteristics are not explicitly mentioned will be given
scant attention  by  the winning  bidders  who  want  to  maximize  their  profits  subject  to  the
contractual  constraints.  Market  competition  provides  continual  implicit  incentives  for  good
performance, in ways that matter to consumers. Innovation is encouraged. Competition bidding
makes  some  of  the  incentives  explicit  ex  ante  and  disregards  the  others-the  essence  of
incomplete contracts. The greater the choice for workers and the contestability at the rebidding
stage, the smaller is this problem. Also, the less confidence one has in the ability of workers to
evaluate  fund  behavior,  the  smaller  is  this  problem-and  different  analysts  probably  have
different priors on this subject. Empirical evidence on the performance of asset managers who
are chosen under different procedures might throw some light on this issue.
Further  along these  lines, a  competitive bidding process  is  inflexible  in  the  face  of
unforeseen  contingencies  that have  not  been  spelled out  in  incomplete  contracts.  One  such
unforeseen  contingency occurred in  Bolivia when the parent  companies  of the two  winning
investment managers merged in a global merger process; in effect the two winners became one
and the duopoly became, effectively, a monopoly.
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two large winners in a competitive bidding process may capture the regulators; the "regulated"
may be in a stronger bargaining position than the regulators. Corruption in the bidding process
and collusion afterwards is a related possibility (Valdes 1  999a). A further problem is that a small
number of large funds may exert  a dominant control over small capital  markets, rather than
helping to develop these market further. These considerations may lead a country to choose a
larger number of winners at the primary bidding stage than would be chosen on the basis of scale
economies alone. Further concentration would then be achieved via the market at the secondary
stage of competition for workers-but  this would increase marketing costs as each "winner" tries
to increase it market share.
A final problem occurs at the rebidding stage. Every competitive bidding process must
specify  a  credible  rebidding  procedure.  But  the  first  winners  may  have  a  big  competitive
advantage over potential contestors in such markets. This is particularly the case if they have
already invested in fixed costs and can therefore underbid new entrants who would have to cover
such costs. A short run bidding competition can thereby become a long run monopoly, with little
regulation or contestability. A large part of the fixed costs consists of the data base of affiliates to
the system. The rebidding contest can be enhanced by separating the R&C  function from the
asset management function, and vesting ownership of the membership database in the system
itself, rather than in the firms that carry out the investment or R&C functions.
The  greater  the  choice,  the  smaller  are  these  dangers  but  the  smaller  also  is  the
opportunity  for depressing  administrative  costs. We thus  face  a  trade-off  between  reducing
administrative costs on the one hand versus increasing continuous incentives, adaptability and
political insulation on the other hand.  It seem plausible that the terms of this trade-off depend on
46the size of the system and the governance capacities of the country. The larger the contribution
base, the  greater the choice that can be allowed while still benefiting from  low costs. Thus,
Sweden is likely to have the same long run costs as Bolivia despite the fact that it offers greater
choice, because of its larger average account size. The TSP has lower fees than Sweden, both
because it has a larger asset base and because it constrains choice to a much greater extent.
These pitfalls can be minimized by a careful writing of the bidding contract-specifying
performance  targets  and  rewards,  rebidding  procedures  and  a  mechanism  for  handling
exceptional contingencies. The more responsible the governance of the country, the more likely
that  contracts will be  carefully written and enforced and thus the lower the political  risks of
operating through the institutional market. While competition and choice always have a role to
play, countries with well developed financial markets and good governance have a wider range
of options, including lower cost options, available to them.
VII. Conclusion
We started this paper by asking: what is the most efficient way to set up an IA component
of a social security system? And, how can the cost advantages of the institutional market that are
obtained by the large investor be garnered by IA systems that consist of many small accounts?
To answer these questions we compared costs in the retail market with those in the institutional
market, including several IA experiments that aggregate these small accounts into large money
blocs in setting price and market access.
Since these systems are new, the evidence is still fragmentary. But so far it is promising.
It appears that substantial cost savings can be realized by investing IA's through the institutional
market with constrained choice. This could raise final accumulations and pensions by  10-20%.
Typically, these  systems  aggregate contributions,  specify  a  small number  of winning  funds
47among whom worker can choose, and use a competitive bidding process to set fees (although
Sweden reverses this process and sets fees, allowing competition to determine quantity).
These  fee  reductions  have  been  achieved  by  (1)  changing  the  range  of  investment
strategies faced by workers, (2) cutting costs and (3) shifting costs or shaving profits. The largest
fee reductions observed  stem from a  product mix change: constraining  choice  to  investment
portfolios and  strategies that  are inexpensive to  implement,  such passive  management  (as  in
TSP).  This  requires  access  to  well  developed  financial  markets  and  has  an  offsetting
disadvantage  for  investors  who  would  have  preferred  different  portfolios.  The  largest  cost
reductions for a given portfolio are achieved by a price-setting process that cuts incentives for
marketing (as in Bolivia and Sweden) and avoids excess capacity at the start of new systems (as
in  Bolivia).  This  is  likely  to  work  best  if  the  collection  and  record-keeping  functions  are
separated from the investment function, which facilitates blind allocations and competition at the
rebidding  stage. The third  effect  is  distributional:  increased  bargaining power  in  an  "all  or
nothing" deal is used to maintain fixed costs in the old voluntary market, to partly transfer them
to future cohorts through extended amortization, and to keep oligopoly profits low.
Any  system  of  constrained  choice  imposes  costs  in  terms  of  satisfying  individual
preferences,  decreasing  market  incentives,  increasing  the  risk  of  political  manipulation,
corruption, collusion and regulatory capture. Investment contracts are bound to be  incomplete
with  respect  to  performance  incentives  and  adaptability  to  unforeseen  contingencies,  and
rebidding  procedures  pose  a  further  problem.  Trade-offs  are  therefore  involved  between
administrative costs and other less certain and less tangible costs.
Probably the least-cost alternatives and trade-offs are available for industrialized rather
than  for  developing  countries.  Industrialized  countries  have  access  to  existing  financial
48institutions,  lower  trading  costs,  passive  investment  opportunities,  and  more  effective
governance. For these reasons, they can save more than 1% per year by constraining choice and
operating through the institutional market. In developing and transitional countries, particularly
those with small contribution and assets bases, investment costs are likely to be higher and the
opportunities for reducing fees lower. In particular, reducing fees through portfolio constraints
may not be a realistic option in the short run for countries that have limited access to passive
management or to large liquid asset classes. For these countries, the main cost-saving measure
may be competitive bidding for a limited number of entry slots, that results in lower costs and
fees  for a  given portfolio.  Based on the experience of  Bolivia, this  offers the possibility of
reducing  costs  substantially, especially  at the  start-up phase-providing  government  has the
capacity and will to construct and enforce the contract carefully.
A total  constraint on  choice implied by  a single centralized fund has led to  poor net
outcomes for workers and misallocated capital in many countries (Palacios and Iglesias  1999),
while the  retail  market  option  has  led  to  substantial  administrative costs.  The  institutional
approach is an intermediate option that retains market incentive while offering the opportunity
for significant cost  saving. Hence, it represents an option that policy-makers should seriously
consider when establishing their mandatory IA systems--providing choice is not constrained "too
much".
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Administrative  Costs Over Time  as % of Assets  and $'s per Account  - Hypothetical  System
Panel A:  Low costs, small contribution base
Costs as % of Assets  Costs as $'s per Account
Year  Year-end  Average size  R  & C  R&C  + Inv  Inv.  exp  R&C  + Inv  R&C/Total
accumulation  account in  per account  per account  exp.
of individual  system
(in $000's) a  (in S000'S)  b
1  0.5  0.5  4.00  4.10  0.5  20.5  0.98
2  1.0  1.0  2.20  2.30  1.0  21.0  0.96
3  1.6  1.6  1.28  1.38  1.6  21.6  0.93
4  2.2  2.1  0.95  1.05  2.1  22.1  0.90
5  2.8  2.7  0.76  0.86  2.7  22.7  0 .88
10  6.4  5.6  0.36  0.46  5.6  25.6  078
15  10.9  8.8  0.23  0.33  8.8  28.8  0.70
20  16.7  12.1  0.17  0.27  12.1  32.1  0.63
25  24.1  15.4  0.13  0.23  15.4  35.4  0.57
30  33.6  18.5  0.11  0.21  18.5  38.5  0.52
35  45.6  20.8  0.10  0.20  20.8  40.8  0.50
40  61.0  22.0  0.09  0.19  22.0  42.0  0.47
Panel B:  Low costs, high contribution base
r  Costs  as  % of Assets  Costs  as  $'s per  Account
Year  Year-end  Average size  R & C  R&C  + Inv  nv.  exp  R&C  + Inv  R&C/Total
accumulation  account in  per account  per account  exp.
of individual  system
(in $000's) a  (in $000's) b
1  2.0  2.0  1.00  1.10  2.0  22.0  0 91
2  4.0  4.0  0.50  0.60  4.0  24.0  0 83
3  6.4  6.4  0.31  0.41  6.4  26.4  0 76
4  8.8  8.4  0.24  0.34  8.4  28.4  0 70
5  11.2  10.8  0.19  0.29  10.8  30.8  0.65
10  25.6  22.4  0.09  0.19  22.4  42.4  0.47
15  43.6  35.2  0.06  0.16  35.2  55.2  0.36
20  66.8  48.4  0.04  0.14  48.4  68.4  0.29
25  96.4  61.6  0.03  0.13  61.6  81.6  0.25
30  134.4  74.0  0.03  0.13  74.0  94.0  0.21
35  182.4  83.2  0.02  0.12  83.2  103.2  0.19
40  244.0  88.0  0.02  0.12  88.0  108.0  0.19
50Panel C:  High costs, high contribution base
Costs as %  of  Assets  Costs as $'s  per
Account
Year  Year-end  Av. size  R&C  R&C  +  R&C  +  Investment  R&C  +  R&Cr
acc.  of  account  in  Investment  Investment  Investment  Total
individual system  + Marketing  +  Marketing
(in $000's) a  (in $000's)_
1  2.0  2.0  1.50  2.10  2.60  12.0  52.0  0.58
2  4.1  4.1  0.74  1.34  1.84  24.3  74.5  0.40
3  6.2  6.0  0.50  1.10  1.60  36.3  96.5  0.31
4  8.5  8.2  0.37  0.97  1.57  49.0  119.9  0.25
5  10.8  10.2  0.29  0.89  1.39  61.4  142.6  0.21
10  23.9  21.0  0.14  0.74  1.24  126.1  261.2  0.11
15  39.8  32.1  0.09  0.69  1.19  192.7  383.3  0.08
20  59.3  43.3  0.07  0.67  1.17  259.8  506.2  0.06
25  82.9  53.9  0.06  0.66  1.16  323.2  622.5  0.05
30  111.6  63.1  0.05  0.65  1.15  378.8  724.5  0.04
35  146.6  70.1  0.04  0.64  1.14  420.4  800.8  0.04
40  189.1  73.2  0.04  0.64  1.14  439.0  834.9  0.04
Assumptions:
Panel A: a $520 is contributed each year, R & C costs = $20 per account, net contribution (NC) =  $500, gross rate of
return = 5.1%, investment costs = 0.1% of assets, net return (NR) = 5.0%.
Panel B: annual contribution = $2020, R&C costs = $20 per account, net contribution = $2,000, gross rate of return
5.1%, investment costs = 0.1% of assets, net return  = 5.0%.
Panel C: annual contribution = $2020, R&C costs = $30 per account, net contribution = $1990, gross rate of return =
5.1%, investment costs = 0.6%, marketing cost = 0.5% of assets, net return = 4%
a  Individual's account accumulates at the following rate: AAt = AAt. 1 (I + NR) + NC.
b  Account size increases at above rate for individuals who stay in system. Withdrawals by high account
individuals who retire and their replacement by incoming workers with small new accounts causc decrease
in average account size in system relative to individual's account.
51TABLE 2
Administrative Fees in Latin American IA Systems, 1999
Gross  Fee Net  Fee  as  Net  Fee  as  Net  Fee  as  %  Net  Fee  as  % % Reduction
Country'  as  %  of  %  of  %  of  Total  of  Current  of Lifetime  in  Final
Wagesb  Wages  Contribution  Assets,  1998  Annual  Capital  and
Assetsg  Pension
Argentinac  (10.0)  3.25  2.30  23.0  7.66  1.13  23.0
Bolivian  (10.6)  4.60  0.60  5.5  3.0  .54  11.1
Colombiac  (11.6)  3.50  1.64  14.1  4.0  0.69  14.1
Chilee  (11.8)  2.47  1.84  15.6  1.36  0.76  15.6
El Salvador (12.1)  3.18  2.13  17.6  - 0.86  17.6
Peru  (12.4)  3.74  2.36  19.0  7.31  0.93  19.0
Mexico'  (8.7)  4.42  1.92  22.1  9.19  1.08  22.1
Uruguay  (14.4)  2.68  2.06  14.3  - 0.70  14.3
Source:  Augusto  Iglesias,  Prim  America  Consultores
a  Total  contribution  rate  = contribution  to IA  System  + net  fee,  as % of wages.  This number  is given  in
parentheses  after each  country.  In Argentina,  Mexico  and Uruguay  the fee is taken  out of the worker's
account,  unlike  other countries  where  the fee is added  on.
b  Gross  fee  includes  premium  for disability  and  survivors  insurance.  Net fee excludes  this premium.
c  Some  AFPs in  Argentina  also  charge  a fixed  fee. The  split between  administrative  fee, insurance  and
other fees  and costs  is difficult  to disentagle  in Argentina  and Colombia.
d  This includes  a fee of .5%  of wages  plus  .235  of assets  that is charged  by the  AFP's plus  .2% of
assets  to the custodian.  The asset-based  part will increase  over  time  as assets  grow,  so total fee as
% of  wages and  contributions  will also  grow  and  will be higher  than numbers  given  in columns  1,2
and 3 in the  future.  Gross  fee includes  2% of wages  for disability  and survivors  benefits.
e  Most  Chilean  AFPs  also  charge  a small  flat fee  per month,  increasing  the net  fee.  Anecdotal  evidence
indicates  that part of the fee is rebated  when  workers  switch  AFPs,  decreasing  the net fee.
f.  In Mexico  the government  contributes  5.5%  of the minimum  wage,  which is estimated  to be 2.2%  of
the average  wage,  to each  account.  This is included  in the total  contribution  rate given  above.
Source  for Mexico:  CONSAR  tabulations,  1997.
g.  This is based  on a simulation  of a full career  worker  who  works  40  years with  an annual  wage  growth
of 2% and  an annual  interest  rate of  5%.
52Table 3 - Assets, Accounts and Costs in Latin America, 1998 (in US$)
Panel A---- using 1998 exchange rate
Country  # of  # of  Exchange  Assets  Total Assets /  Total
Contributors  Affiliates  Rate  (mill US$)  Contributors  Assets /
(millions)  (millions)  (US$)  Affiliates
(US$)
Mexico  11.38  13.83  0.100600  5484.43  482  397
Bolivia  0.46  0.177900  238.39  518
Colombia  1.39  2.91  0.000654  2127.57  1531  731
Peru  0.90  1.98  0.319600  1745.38  1939  882
Argentina  3.46  7.07  1.000200  11528.70  3332  1631
Chile  3.15  5.97  0.002111  31056.17  9859  5202
Country  Fee per  Expenses per  Fee per  Expenses per  Fee per Unit  Expenses
Contributor  Contributor  Affiliate  Affiliate  of Asset (%)  per Unit of
(US$)  (US$)  (US$)  (US$)  Assets
(%)
Mexico  43  44  35  36  8.82  9.19
Bolivia  16  21  3.00  4.04
Colombia  61  101  29  48  4.00  6.63
Peru  142  158  64  59  7.31  6.74
Argentina  261  200  128  98  7.66  6.80
Chile  134  111  71  59  1.36  1.13
Panel B---- using 1997 PPP
Country  # of  # of  Exchange  Assets  Total Assets /  Total
Contributors  Affiliates  Rate  (mill US$)  Contributors  Assets /
(millions)  (millions)  (US$)  Affiliates
(US$)
Mexico  11.38  13.83  0.25  13629.30  1198  986
Bolivia  0.46  0.5263  705.26  1533
Colombia  1.39  2.91  0.0025  8132.92  5851  2795
Peru  0.90  1.98  0.6667  3640.93  4045  1839
Argentina  3.46  7.07  1.1111  12806.98  3701  1811
Chile  3.15  5.97  0.0058  85338.19  27091  14295
Country  Fee per  Expenses per  Fee per  Expenses per  Fee per Unit  Expenses
Contributor  Contributor  Affiliate  Affiliate  of Asset (%)  per Unit of
(US$)  (US$)  (US$)  (US$)  Assets
(%)
Mexico  106  110  87  91  8.82  9.19
Bolivia  46  62  3.00  4.04
Colombia  234  388  112  185  4.00  6.63
Peru  296  273  134  124  7.31  6.74
Argentina  290  222  142  109  7.66  6.80
Chile  368  307  196  162  1.36  1.13
Source: PrimeAmerica Consultores, taken from reports of Superintendencias.
*  Countries are arranged in order of total assets/affiliates at 1998 exchange rate
Note:  In Colombia and Argentina AFP's engage in other insurance activities whose fees and costs are
difficult to disentangle from pension administration. In Bolivia an additional 0.2% of assets is paid to the
custodian.
53Table  4
Assets,  Fees and Expenditures  in Chile  Through  Time
Year  # of  Contributors/  Assets  Total  Assets  Total  Assets  Marketing
Affiliates  Affiliates  (1998  US$  /Contributors  /Affiliates  Costs as % of
(millions)  mill.)  (1998  US$)  (1998 US$)  Total Exp.
1982  1.44  0.74  1277.74  1205  887  46
1983  1.62  0.76  2212.50  1799  1366  40
1984  1.93  0.70  2842.46  2090  1473  36
1985  2.28  0.68  2290.61  1470  1003  30
1986  2.59  0.68  3112.55  1779  1201  24
1987  2.89  0.70  3812.46  1884  1319  21
1988  3.18  0.68  4868.26  2246  1529  23
1989  3.47  0.65  5844.70  2577  1684  22
1990  3.74  0.61  8144.61  3558  2178  24
1991  4.11  0.61  11999.98  4825  2920  26
1992  4.43  0.61  14265.43  5292  3217  30
1993  4.71  0.59  17839.38  6389  3788  35
1994  5.01  0.57  24206.33  8406  4827  38
1995  5.32  0.56  27039.54  9129  5082  43
1996  5.57  0.56  28366.44  9088  5091  49
1997  5.78  0.57  31133.98  9445  5386  52
1998  5.97  0.53  31060.16  9861  5206  46
Year  Fee per  Expenses  per  Fee per  Expenses  per  Fee per Unit  Expenses  per
Contributor  Contributor  Affiliate  Affiliate  of Assets  Unit of
(1998  US$)  (1998 US$)  (1998 US$)  (1998  US$)  (%)  Assets (%)
1982  113  145  83  106  9.39  12.00
1983  101  102  77  77  5.63  5.65
1984  102  97  72  68  4.90  4.65
1985  52  50  36  34  3.54  3.41
1986  52  46  35  31  2.93  2.57
1987  49  42  34  29  2.60  2.22
1988  58  50  39  34  2.57  2.23
1989  64  51  42  33  2.49  1.97
1990  71  63  43  39  2.00  1.77
1991  81  68  49  41  1.68  1.41
1992  95  74  58  45  1.79  1.39
1993  103  92  61  54  1.61  1.43
1994  123  114  71  65  1.47  1.35
1995  143  124  79  69  1.56  1.35
1996  145  128  81  72  1.59  1.41
1997  148  131  84  75  1.56  1.38
1998  134  112  71  59  1.36  1.13
Source:  PrimeAmerica  Consultores  based  on  reports  of Superintendencias,  and  authors'  calculations.
Exchange  Rates:  1982-0.017103, 1983-0.013734, 1984-0.01 1233,  1985-0.005445, 1986-O.004878, 1987-
0.004200,  1988-0.004041, 1989-.0.003372,  1990-0.002969, 199  1-0.002668,
1992--0.002616,  1993- 0.002320,  1994-0.002475, 1995- 0.002456,  1996-0.002353,
1997--0.002274,  1998-0.002111.
54Table 5 A
Regression Analysis: Determinants of Costs and Fees, Chile, 1982-98: Aggregate Analysis
Devendent Variables
Independent  Total  Total Cost l  Total Cost /  Total Fee  Total Fees  Total Fees l
Variables  Admin.  Assets  Affiliates  Revenues  Assets  Affiliates
Cost
Assets  0.012  -0.00004  0.001  0.013  -0.00005  0.002
(24.38)'  (4.14)'  (12.00)'  (30.47)'  (5.39)'  (16.48)'
Dummy, start-  92.781  9.581  77.936  47.948  6.629  50.182
up year=82  (4.74)'  (20.16)'  (14.91)'  (2.54)"'  (16.14)'  (11.61)'
Dummy, start-  53.611  2.787  42.486  43.532  2.567  39.383
up years=83-4  (3.44)'  (7.81)*  (10.83)'  (3.07)"  (8.33)*  (12.14)'
Constant  45.780  2.476  26.704  55.269  2.826  31.078
(5.18)'  (12.22)'  (2.23)"'  (6.87)'  (16.14)'  (16.87)'
Rz  0.976  0.974  0.951  0.985  0.967  0.956
N  17  17  17  17  17  17
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses  -
* Significant at 0.1% level  ** Significant at 1% level  *** Significant at 5% level
Units of measurement: costs, fees, and assets are 1998 US dollars in millions; # of contributors and
affiliates are in millions; cost/assets and fees/assets are in %; cost/affiliates, fees/affiliates and
assets/affiliates are in 1998 US dollars.
55Table 5B
Fixed Effects Regression for Chile: Disaggregated by AFP and Year
Indept.  Cost  Cost/Affiliate  Cost/Asset
variable  quadratic  Logs  quadratic  Logs  No logs  quadratic  Logs
Affiliate  3.711  0.350  -78.510  -0.650  11.712  13.587  0.350
(0.65)  (5.54)'  (-0.79)  (-10.31)'  (0.49)  (3.71)'  (5.54)'
Affiliate  -2.211  28.336  -3.651
square  (-0.95)  (0.70)  (-2.47)."
Asset  0.011  0.535  0.046  0.535  -0.002  -0.465
(11.95)'  (14.53)'  (2.76)  (1.248)  (-2.82)"  (-12.61)'
Asset square  -1.5e-07  -5.5e-06  1.3e-07
(-1.01)  (-2.10)-  (1.33)
Asset/Affiliate  0.009
(4.56)'
Dummy,start-  6.692  1.248  89.603  1.248  96.328  15.121  1.248
up year=82  (5.38)  (16.45)'  (4.14)'  (16.45)  (4.89)'  (19.06)'  (16.45)
Dummy,  3.384  0.655  44.172  0.655  47.804  4.316  0.655
start-up  (3.50)  (11.53)'  (2.63)"  (11.53)  (3.15)  (7.00)  (11.53)'
year-=83,84
Constant  3.556  -0.339  84.942  -0.339  51.181  0.695  4.266
(3.94)  (-0.98)  (5.42)'  (-0.98)  (4.57)'  (1.21)  (12.33)'
R-  Within  0.923  0.917  0.134  0.703  0.173  0.681  0.868
sq  Between  0.938  0.931  0.137  0.775  0.036  0.110  0.533
Overall  0.916  0.935  0.0003  0.817  0.210  0.335  0.753
N  234  232  234  232  234  234  232
Indept.  Fee  Fee/Affiliate  Fee/Asset
variable  quadratic  Logs  quadratic  Logs  No logs  quadratic  Logs
Affiliate  16.266  0.803  -146.971  -0.197  -3.719  3.865  0.803
(2.66)"  (9.99)*  (-2.94)  (-2.45)  (-0.36)  (2.28)  (9.99)
Affiliate  -9.792  27.307  -1.631
square  (-.97) *  (1.36)  (-2.39).".
Asset  0.010  0.389  0.047  0.389  -0.002  -0.611
(10.27)'  (8.17)'  (5.64)'  (8.17)'  (-5.37)'  (-12.86)'
Asset square  5.5e-7  -3.8e-06  1.9e-07
(3.45)'  (-.90)"  (4.36)'
Asset/Affiliate  0.010
(12.81)'
Dummy,start-  4.433  0.828  16.121  0.828  32.772  5.401  0.828
up year=82  (3.35)'  (8.41)  (1.49)  (8.41)  (3.87)'  (14.72)'  (8.41)'
Dummy,  3.992  0.814  33.096  0.814  44.289  2.969  0.814
start-up  (3.88)'  (11.07)'  (3.94)  (11.07)  (6.81)  (10.41)'  (11.07)'
year=83,84
Constant  2.569  1.439  85.478  1.439  33.238  2.428  6.044
(2.68)"  (3.23)"  (10.91)'  (3.23)"  (6.92)'  (9.13)'  (13.56)'
R-  Within  0.946  0.903  0.285  0.552  0.495  0.699  0.715
sq  Between  0.947  0.946  0.138  0.179  0.882  0.850  0.697
Overall  0.956  0.915  0.278  0.275  0.832  0.702  0.566
N  234  234  234  234  234  234  234
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis.
Significance level: 0.1% *
Significance level: 1%  * *
Significance level: 5%  ***
See Table 5A for units of measurement. Similar results were obtained in a random effects analysis.
56TABLE 6
Annual Asset-based  Fee Equivalent  to 15.6%  Fee on New Contributions  in Chile
(as percentage  of assets)
Starting  Age  Contribution  Made  Contributions  Made  For  20  Contributions  Made  Every
For  Years  Year
1 Year  Only  At Given  Only,  Starting  At Given  Age  Until  Age  65,
Age
Starting  At  Given  Age
1  2  3
25  0.45  0.57  0.76
35  0.60  0.85  1.05
45  0.91  1.65  1.65
55  1.86  3.50
641  33.37  33.37
Assumptions:
This table shows  the annual fee based on assets that will yield the same capital accumulation  at
age 65 as would a 15.6%  front-loaded  fee on in-coming  contributions.  In column 1 a single year
of contributions  is assumed at the starting age. The annual fee for age 64 is 33.37% because
contributions  and fees are assumed  to be paid monthly,  including  the last month.  In column 2 the
worker  continues  contributing  a fixed percentage  of wage for 20 years. In column 3 the worker
continues  investing  a fixed  percentage  of wage  from starting  age until age 65. A rate of return of
5% is assumed. For columns 2 and 3, annual wage growth of 2% is assumed. Similar results
were obtained for 3% rate of return and 1% rate of wage growth. In US $'s,  the average
contributor pays  $134 today in  Chile. The fee would increase 2% per year under these
assumptions.
57TABLE 7
Composition of Mutual Fund Expenses, 1997
(as % of assets and $'s per account)
Simple  Asset-Weighted
Average  Average  Active  Passive
Expenses  Included  in Expense  Ratio
Investment  Advisor  0.56  0.49  0.52  0.08
Distributor  for 12b1  fees*  0.35  0.21  0.22  0.02
Transfer  Agent  (R&C)  0.13  0.12  0.12  0.05
Other (legal,  audit,  etc.)  0.23  0.09  0.08  0.13
Reported  expense  ratio  1.27  0.91  0.95  0.28
$'s  per account**  $320  $228  $238  $70
Other  Investor  Costs
Brokerage  fees (trading  costs)  0.26  0.12  0.12  0.03
Annualized  front-loaded  sales  charge
paid  by shareholder**  0.31  0.40  0.43  0.01
Total  investor  costs  as % of assets  1.85  1.43  1.50  0.32
$'s per account**  $463  $360  $375  $80
T  The 12bl  fee is a fee that is paid annually by the fund, primarily for distribution of new
shares and related service. It is financed by a charge paid by all shareholders, whether or not
they have purchased their shares through a broker. It is part of the fund's expense ratio and is
based on assets. The front-loaded sales charge is paid directly to the distributor by investors
who purchase through brokers, as a % of their new investment. It is not included in the fund's
expense ratio. The average front-loaded fee is 4.48%. It is charged by about 1/3 of all funds.
In this table, this one-time fee has been annualized according to the procedure described in
endnote 1.These numbers are averaged over all funds, ignoring the big distinction in costs to
shareholders between funds that impose sales charges and those that do not.
**  For average  account  size = $25,000
58TABLE 8
Determinants of Expense Ratios of Mutual Funds in the U.S., 1997
(dependent variable is total expenses/total assets, in basis points) 1
1  2  3  4  5
CORE GROUP
Intercept  113.7  (59.63)w  112.1  (55.35)  111.0  (22.22)  83.4  (22.03)* 125.0  (26.09)i
Assets in $billion  -9.2  (-9.55)*  -7.9 (-10.  03)*  -9.1  (-9.61)*  -3.9  (-5.65)*  -5.2  (-5.67)l
Asset 2 0.1  (5.22J  0.1  (7.20)  r  0.1  (5.48) ,  0.1  (-6.17)w  0.1  (4.51)l
# Shareholders in 000's  0.1  (3.14)*  0.1  (3.02)  0.0  (-1.48)  0.0  (0.89)
Assets/Shareholders  04  (49)  '
Assets in Fund  Complex  -0.1  (.7.99)*  -0.1  (-7.61)*  -0.1  (-8.66)  -0.1  (-7.31)*  -0.1 (-10.07)*
3 Year Net Return 2 -1.5  (-13.73)*  -0.9  (-6.26)  -0.7  (-6.37)*  -0.7  (-4.84)
# Year Gross Return  - -1.1  (-9.73)*  _  .
3 Year  Standard  Deviation  4.6  (29.56)  4.4  (27.93)*  3.5  (14.24)*  3.1  (17.94)*  3.3  (14.32)*
ASSET ALLOCATION
Bond  1  ___=  __  -1.9  (-0.52)  -9.6  (-3.71)*  -8.0  (-2.35)**
Small Cap  _  l  l  l  3.2  (0.76)  11.6  (3.98)*  -0.2  (0.05)
Specialty  l  l  l  23.0  (6.01)4  11.7  (4.33J  16.4  (4.61)*
International  i  _  r  --  28.9  (7.61)*i 24.1  (8.96)*  24.5  (6.89)*
Emerging Market  _  l  |  __l_l  _  37.6  (5.25)*[  37.5  (7.43)*  39.9  (5.53)
INVESTMENT  AND
MARKETING STRATEGY
Institutional  -15.4  (-4.23)*  -52.8  (-11.45)*
Initial Investment  -0.4  (-3.22)*  -0.4  (-1.9)*l
Index  -38.5  (-8.72)*  -51.7  (-8.86)*
12b1 fee<1,>0  . 18.4  (9.73)  *
12b1 fee = 1  _  43.5  (14.19)*
Front load  2.7  (-1.43)
Deferred Load  47.3  (16.86)*
Turnover  4.3  (8.21)*  6.01  (8.65)  *
Bank Advised  =  -8.1  (-4.44)  -18.7  (-7.88)*
Fundage  -0.2  (-3.26)*  -1.1  (-12.37)*
Adjusted R2  23.8  22.2  26.9  64.2  38.0
Dep Mean  127.6  127.6  127.6  127.6  127.6
N  36101  3610  3610  3610  3610
I  Brokerage fees and front and deferred loads are not included in expense ratios.
For each equation, first column gives coefficient and second column gives t statistics
1 Basis Point=  0.01%
2  3 year net returns are gross returns adjusted for expense ratio and loads
*  Significant at 0.2% level
**  Significant at 5% level
59TABLE 9
Determinants of Expense Ratios of Mutual Funds, US, 1992-97
(dependent variable is total expenses/total assets, in basis points)
1  |  |  2  3  4  l_
CORE GROUP
Intercept  22.6  (12.73)  23.0  (12.31)*  26.4  (9.17)*  65.0  (31.91)*
Assets  in $billion  -3.5  (-5.97)*  -2.2  (5.97) *  -2.7  (7.05)*  -2.3  (4.64)*
Asset 2 0.1  (5.77)*  1.0  (5.33)  *  0.1  (6.18)*  0.1  (~6.21)*
# Shareholders  0.03  (2.68)**  l___  0.0  (1.3)
Assets/Shareholders  -1.0  (-3.11)  i  -0.1  (-3.17)*
Assets  in Funds  Complex  -0.1  (I6.27)*  -0.1  (-8.47)*  -0.1  (-8.23)*  -0.1  (-12.94)*
3 Year Net Return 3 -0.6 (-16.25)*  -0.5  (-13.5)*  =  _
# Year Gross Return  -0.4 (-11.31)*  -0.3  (-.8.89)*
3 Year  Standard  Deviation  0.13  (16.79)  1.5  (19.2)*  1.0  (-11.59)*  1.0  (12.82)*
ASSET ALLOCATION
Bond  _  -12.6  (-7.57)*  -23.8  (-19.25)*
Small Cap  14.9  (5.12)*  11.5  (6.25)*
Specialty  15.7  (5.59)*  6.8  (3.96)*
International  18.5  (7.65) *  21.7  (13.72)*
Emerging Market  59.9  (12.92)  *  48.2  (15.64)*
INVESTMENT  AND
MARKETING STRATEGY
Institutional  -15.4  (-8.09)*
Initial Investment  -0.3  (-2.48)**
Index  -38.6  (-14.18)*
12b1 fee<1,>0  17.7  (13.84)*
12b1 fee = 1  49.9  (23.16)*
Front load  6.2  (471)*
Deferred Load  49.7  (25.3)*
Turnover  2.0  (7 46)*
Bank Advised  -2.4  (=i.92)
Fundage  -0.4  (-8.95)*
Time  2.3  (11.17)*  2.3  (10.66)*  2.3  (10.96)*  1.2  (6141)*
1  See notes for Table 8
60TABLE 10
Marketing  Expenses in U.S. Mutual  Funds*
UNWEIGHTED  WEIGHTED
1992  1997  1992  1997
Prevalence  of commissions  (% of total  funds)
-funds with 12b1  fees  55.00  61.00  49.00  46.00
- funds  with Fload  50.00  35.00  52.00  42.00
- funds  with Dload  9.00  27.00  9.00  12.00
- funds  with no load  or 12b1  fee  34.00  32.00  36.00  44.00
Expenses  as % of assets  - all  funds
Average  12b1  fee  0.21  0.35  0.18  0.21
Average  annualized  Fload  0.46  0.31  0.50  0.40
Reported  expense  ratio  1.16  1.28  0.87  0.91
Brokerage  fees (trading  costs)  0.27  0.26  0.15  0.12
Total expenses  1.89  1.85  1.52  1.43
Marketing  expenses  as % of total  expenses  35.00  36.00  45.00  43.00
Expenses  as  % of  assets  -
Funds  with  either  12b1  or  Fload
Average  12b1  fee  0.38  0.52  0.36  0.37
Average  Fload  0.65  0.46  0.75  0.72
Reported  expense  ratio  1.27  1.46  0.98  1.09
Brokerage  fees  0.28  0.28  0.15  0.11
Total  investor  cost ratio  2.20  2.20  1.88  1.92
Marketing  expenses  as % of total  expenses  46.82  44.55  59.04  56.77
Expenses  as  % of  assets  -
Funds without 12b1 or Fload**
Average  12b1  fee  0  0  0  0
Average  Fload  0  0  0  0
Reported  expense  ratio  0.94  0.89  0.68  0.68
Brokerage  fees  0.29  0.23  0.17  0.12
Total  investor  cost ratio  1.23  1.12  0.85  0.80
*  For 12b1  fee,  FLoad  and Total  Expenses,  see Table  7 and  endnotes
61TABLE  11
Institutional  v. Retail,  Passive v. Active Mutual  Funds
Average Expense Ratios and Investor  Costs as % of Assets, 1997*
A.  Expense Ratio - Unweighted  ALL  ACTIVE  PASSIVE
ALL  RETAIL  INSTIT.  RETAIL  INSTIT.  RETAIL  INSTI
Domestic Stock Funds  1.43  1.47  0.91  1.50  0.98  0.71  0  ..
Domestic Bond Funds  1.08  1.12  0.62  1.12  0.62  0.65  0.
International Stock Funds  1.69  1.75  1.09  1.77  1.15  0.95  0.1
Emerging Market  Funds  2.12  2.19  1.39  2.21  1.39  0.57
All Funds in Universe  1.28  1.31  0.79  1.33  0.81  0.72  0..
B. Expense Ratio - Weighted by Assets  ALL  ACTIVE  PASSIVE
ALL  RETAIL  INSTIT.  RETAIL  INSTIT.  RETAIL  INSTI'
Domestic Stock Funds  0.93  0.94  0.51  0.99  0.85  0.31  0.
Domestic Bond Funds  0.80  0.82  0.53  0.82  0.54  0.25  0.-
International Stock Funds  1.18  1.19  0.96  1.20  0.97  0.42  0.t
Emerging Market Funds  1.75  1.77  1.25  1.81  1.25  0.57  0.1
All Funds in Universe  0.91  0.93  0.56  0.96  0.69  0.31  0.:
C. Total Investor Costs Including
Annualized Floads and Brokerage  ALL  ACTIVE  PASSIVE
Fees -Weighted  by Assets
ALL  RETAIL  INSTIT.  RETAIL  INSTIT.  RETAIL  INSTI
Domestic Stock Funds  1.44  1.47  0.60  1.55  0.97  0.37  0.
Domestic Bond Funds  1.30  1.35  0.62  1.36  0.65  0.31  0
International Stock Funds  1.83  1.87  1.05  1.89  1.09  0.48  0.
Emerging Market Funds  2.29  2.33  1.34  2.38  1.37  0.63
All Funds in Universe  1.44  1.48  0.65  1.52  0.81  0.37  0..
*  For 12bl fee, Fload and total expenses see Table 7 and endnote 1.
62TABLE 12
Marginal and Average Asset Management Fees for Institutional Investors
How they Vary with Amount of Investment  (in basis points) 1
Passive  Domestic  Equity  Large  cap.  Small  & Mid cap.
<$5 million  20.0  25.0
5-10 million  10.0  15.0
10-25  million  8.0  10.0
25-100  million  6.0  7.5
100-200  million  3.0  5.0
Balance  1.0  2.5
Average  fee for $100 million  7.2  9.1
Average  fee for $500 million  2.6  4.3
Median  cost-large  US pens.  Funds 2 4.0  7.0
Median  cost-largest  US  pens.  Funds 3 1.0  6.0
Active Domestic  Equity  Value  Growth  Small  Cap.
<$5 million  65.0  80.0  100.0
5-25 million  35.0  80.0  100.0
Balance  35.0  50.0  100.0
Average  fee for $100  million  36.5  57.5  100.0
Average  fee for $500  million  35.3  51.5  100.0
Median  cost-large  pension  funds  37.0  69.0
Median  cost-largest  pension  funds  25.0  55.0
International  Equity  Index  Active
<$10  million  25.00  90.0
10-25  million  25.00  70.0
25-40  million  20.00  70.0
40-50  million  20.00  60.0
50-100  million  15.00  60.0
Balance  10.00  60.0
Average  fee for $100 million  18.75  66.0
Average  fee for $500 million  11.75  61.2
Median  cost-large  pension  funds  12.00  54.0
Median  cost-largest  pension  funds  8.00  34.0
63Emerging  Market  Index  Active
<$50  million  40  100
Balance  40  80
Average  fee for $100 million  40  90
Average  fee for $500  million  40  82
Median  cost-large  pension  funds  23  77
Median  cost-largest  pension  funds  12  70
Fixed  income  Index  Active
<$25  million  12.0  30
25-50 million  8.0  24
50-1  00 million  5.0  17
Balance  3.0  12
Average  fee for $100 million  7.5  22
Average  fee for $500 million  3.9  14
Median  cost-large  pension  funds  6.0  24
Median  cost-largest  pension  funds  5.0  25
Other  asset management  costs  for
institutional  investors 4
Intemal  administrative  costs:
- median  cost-large  pension  funds  6
- median  cost-largest  pension  funds  2
Brokerage  costs (trading  costs):
- median  cost-large  pension  funds  10
- median  cost-largest  pension  funds  _
1  Sliding scale fees for institutional commingled funds, the BT Pyramid funds, were supplied
by Bankers  Trust, a  large money manager  of indexed and actively  managed  institutional
funds. Data on large US pension funds is from: "Cost Effectiveness Pension Fund Report",
prepared by CEM, 1997 for CALPERS
2  These are median costs of external money management for given type of assets, reported by
167 large US pension funds ranging in size from less than $100 million to over $100 billion.
Median fund = $1.5 billion. Average of 14 external money managers per fund, managing
$194 million each, median amount managed per manager  = $113 million
3  These are median costs for 10 largest US pension funds, excluding Calpers, ranging in size
from  $29-65 billion.  Average of  34 external money  managers  per  fund  managing  $646
million each ($543 million median)
4  This  includes  brokerage  (trading  costs)  plus  internal  administrative  costs  of  money
management,  such  as  executive  pay,  consultants,  performance  measurement,  custodial
arrangements, trustees and audits. The breakdown by passive and active is not available, but
brokerage costs are estimated to be much lower for passive.
64TABLE 13
Administrative Costs of Thrift Saving Plan 1988-98
Year  Expense Ratio Average Size  Administrative  Investment Cost  R & C Cost
As % of  Account  Cost per Account  per Account  per Account
Assets  (in OOO$'s)  (in $'s)  (in 1998  $'s)  ($'s)  (in $'s)  (in 1998  $'s)
1988  .70  2.4  16.8  (22.7)  1.0  15.8  (21.4)
1989  .46  3.7  17.1  (22.21)  1.5  15.5  (20.2)
1990  .29  5.1  14.81  (18.00)  2.0  12.8  (15.6)
1991  .26  6.7  17.4  (20.71)  2.7  14.7  (17.6)
1992  .23  8.5  19.6  (22.53)  3.4  16.2  (18.6)
1993  .19  10.7  20.3  (22.81)  4.3  16.1  (18.0)
1994  .16  12.8  20.6  (22.39)  5.1  15.4  (16.7)
1995  .14  16.5  23.1  (24.57)  6.6  16.5  (17.6)
1996  .13  20.1  26.2  (27.01)  8.0  18.1  (18.7)
1997  .12  25.3  30.3  (30.61)  10.1  20.2  (20.4)
1998  .11  27.4  30.1  (30.10)  11.1  19.2  (19.2)
Source: Thrift Saving Plan publications and authors' calculations.
Expense ratio in columnn  1 is reported gross expense ratio as reported in TSP publications (before
adjustrnent for forfeitures) plus 3 basis points imputed by authors for brokerage (trading) fees.
Columns 5 and 6 are authors'  estimates separating R&C from investment expenses. Investment
expenses  are  assumed  to  be  3  basis  points  of  trading  costs  plus  1  basis  point  for  asset
management,  custodian,  legal  and  auditing  fees  related  to  investments.  R&C  costs  are  the
remainder. TSP does not  report its  brokerage costs or breakdown  of other expenses between
investment and R&C.
(*) Based on Jan.-Aug., annualized
65TABLE  14
Fee Ceilings in Swedish IA System (as  % of assets)
A.  Marginal Fee Kept by Mutual Funds by Tranche of Assets they Attract in IA System*
Million  KR  Marginal  fees  VOLFEE  = 200  VOLFEE - 150  VOLFEE  =40
0 - 70  0.40 + 0.75 (VOLFEE - 0.40)  1.60  1.23  0.40
70 - 300  0.35 + 0.35 (VOLFEE - 0.35)  0.93  0.75  0.37
300 - 500  0.30  + 0.15 (VOLFEE  - 0.30)  0.56  0.48  0.32
500 - 3000  0.25 + 0.05 (VOLFEE - 0.25)  0.34  0.31  0.26
3000  -7000  0.15 + 0.05  (VOLFEE  - 0.15)  0.24  0.22  0.16
7000  +  0.12  + 0.04 (VOLFEE- 0.12)  0.20  0.18  0.13
B. Average Fee Kept by Mutual Funds by Total Fund Assets they attract in IA System
Million  KR  VOLFEE  = 200  VOLFEE  = 150  VOLFEE  = 40
70  1.60  1.23  0.40
150  1.24  0.97  0.38
500  0.87  0.71  0.35
1000  0.61  0.51  0.30
3000  0.43  0.38  0.27
7000  0.32  0.29  0.21
15000  0.25  0.23  0.17
Source: PPM
This  table shows  the share  of the mutual  fund's fee in the voluntary  market  (VOLFEE)  that it is permitted  to charge
in the mandatory  IA System,  depending  on the assets  that it attracts  in the IA System.  Fees are all expressed  as a %
of assets.  One $US  = 8.2 Kronors.  Panel A shows  marginal  fees,  panel  B shows  average  fees.  Based  on current  rates,
an additional  0.2% fee is estimated  to be charged  to cover  trading  costs (brokers'  commissions).  This is charged  as a
deduction  from net assets. While  this is the current  fee, competitive  forces  may  push it lower  in the new system.
66TABLE 15
Average Annual Fees as % of Assets for Alternative  IA Systems
Retail  Institutional
Latin America  Chile  Bolivia - Competitive Bidding
Startup  9.39  3.00
Current  1.36  3.00
Lifetime  simulation  0.76  0.54
Sweden  Mutual Funds  IA Systems  - Price Ceilings
Current  1.50  0.80
Long  run  0.50
United States  Mutual Funds  Hypothetical IA Systems
Active  1.50  0.64
Passive  0.32  0.16
TSP (competitive  bidding,
_ passive)
_______  ____________________  _  _______________  0.11
See text and  tables,  especially  tables  2, 6, 7, 12,  13  for  derivation  of these  numbers.
Lifetime  simulations  are  derived  from  Tables  2 and  6.
These  numbers  include  imputed  brokerage  commissions  (trading  costs)  and  custodial  costs.
Numbers  for Sweden  are guestimates,  based  on assumption  that average  fee kept by participating
mutual  funds  will be  .3%  of assets  in  short  run,  .2%  in long  run.  PPM  costs  are  .3%  in short  run,  .1%  in
long  run,  trading  and  other  costs  = .2%  of assets.
67Figure 1 Costs of Chilean AFP System, 1982-1998
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referred to earlier, also benefit from low marketing expense in the absence of worker choice.
7  If  price  is  set  too  low,  entry may  be  too  limited  or  service  and  quality  of  entrants  too
constrained. If it is set on the wrong base, as in Kazakhstan, this may restrict entry and create
incentives for non-optimal investment behavior. If it does not adequately distinguish among asset
classes, "expensive" assets may be excluded from the market; this may have occurred in Sweden.Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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